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Two Essays on Market Efficiency ⎯ Tests of Idiosyncratic Risk: Informed Trading 
versus Noise and Arbitrage Risk, and Agency Costs and the Underlying Causes of 
Mispricing: Information Asymmetry versus Conflict of Interests 
 
Jung Chul Park 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I examine the informational efficiency of stock markets by testing the relation 
between idiosyncratic volatility and equity mispricing. I find that the level of mispricing 
declines with idiosyncratic volatility consistent with the notion that greater levels of firm-
specific risk reflect greater participation of informed traders in the market for the stock. 
However, I also find that mispricing increases with idiosyncratic volatility for highly 
volatile stocks, and this is attributed to both noise trading and arbitrage risk.  
In addition, I investigate the link between agency costs and equity mispricing, and 
whether it exists due to information asymmetry or the degree of conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders. I provide evidence that the level of agency costs is 
positively related with mispricing. In contrast to previous studies’ claim that the 
information asymmetry level is a key determinant in the equity mispricing, I find that the 
conflict of interests is more important than information asymmetry in explaining equity 
mispricing. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that stock option grants, originally 
intended to resolve conflicts of interests, actually exaggerate this problem.  
 v
Essay 1 
Tests of Idiosyncratic Risk: Informed Trading versus Noise and Arbitrage Risk 
I. Introduction 
What does idiosyncratic volatility mean? In the context of asset pricing, 
idiosyncratic volatility measures the part of the variation in returns that cannot be 
explained by the particular asset pricing model used. Other than the stale econometric 
definition of idiosyncratic volatility, there is little consensus regarding the meaning of 
idiosyncratic risk in the context of market efficiency. The finance literature has argued 
that idiosyncratic volatility can reflect the capitalization of private information into 
prices, noise trading and/or costly arbitrage.1  
This paper contributes to the finance literature by reconciling the different views 
on idiosyncratic risk. The goal of this study is to clearly distinguish if and when each of 
the three aforementioned views of idiosyncratic volatility is more appropriate. In order to 
achieve my goal, I investigate the relationship between equity mispricing and 
idiosyncratic risk and develop three hypotheses, one predicting a negative relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing, and the other two predicting a positive 
one. On one hand, the informed trading hypothesis regards idiosyncratic risk as a sign of 
active trading by informed arbitrageurs who trace firms’ fundamental value, and thus 
predicts that equity mispricing should be lower for high idiosyncratic risk firms. On the 
other hand, the noise trading hypothesis regards idiosyncratic risk as a sign of 
                                                 
1 For a description of the different views on idiosyncratic risk, see Roll (1988), Morck, Yeung and Yu 
(2000), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), Durnev, Morck and Zarowin (2003), Kelly (2005) and Pontiff 
(2005), among many others.  
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uninformed traders’ noise trading which causes the stock’s price to deviate from 
fundamental value, and thus predicts a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and 
mispricing. The arbitrage risk hypothesis proposes that idiosyncratic risk reflects costs of 
arbitrage, and also predicts a positive relation. I test these hypotheses in an empirical 
framework that utilizes equity mispricing proxies based on several relative valuation 
measures, which are constructed as absolute deviations of a firm’s equity value from its 
fundamental value. When I estimate a linear regression model of the relation between 
mispricing and idiosyncratic volatility, I find that the level of mispricing declines in 
idiosyncratic risk, consistent with the informed trading hypothesis. However, both 
univariate tests as well as multivariate tests of models that include a second-order 
idiosyncratic risk term provide strong evidence of a non-linear, U-shaped relationship. 
Specifically, I find that the level of equity mispricing first decreases until a firm-specific 
risk (1 – 2R ) approaches levels in excess of 90%, but then increases thereafter. The 
number of observations after the inflection point accounts for 10% of total firm-year 
observations. These findings suggest that in most cases (about 90% of total), 
idiosyncratic risk implies that informed trading leads to low equity mispricing. Moreover, 
the results also suggest that at extremely high idiosyncratic risk levels, noise trading 
and/or arbitrage risk are causing prices to deviate from fundamentals. 
To establish if only one of the two or both factors (i.e., noise trading and/or 
arbitrage risk) are reflected in the right arm of the U-shaped curve that empirically 
describes the relationship between mispricing and idiosyncratic volatility, I re-examine 
the relationship for sub-samples constructed by classifying firms on firm-level 
 2
uncertainty and short-selling constraints measures. Assuming that the proportion of noise 
traders increases with the firm’s informational uncertainty (see Black (1986)), I employ a 
composite measure of uncertainty to sort firms into sub-samples that are (are not) 
dominated by noise traders. Furthermore, assuming that, in the absence of constraints to 
short-sales, informed investors have more and better opportunities to engage in arbitrage, 
I sort on measures of short-selling constraints to construct sub-samples of firms that are 
(are not) affected by arbitrage risk. The test results reveal that the non-linear, U-shaped 
relationship between mispricing and IV remains significant for sub-samples of firms that 
display low levels of either noise trading or arbitrage risk. The non-linear relationship 
collapses to a linear one for the sub-sample containing firms that are classified as having 
both a less uncertain information environment and low short-selling constraints. In this 
sub-sample, equity mispricing is monotonically decreasing in idiosyncratic volatility. 
This evidence is consistent with the notion that the increase in mispricing associated with 
high idiosyncratic risk levels (i.e., highly volatile stocks) reflects both noise trading and 
arbitrage risk.  
Therefore, based on my findings, I conclude that idiosyncratic volatility in stock 
returns may primarily reflect informational market efficiency, but extremely high levels 
of idiosyncratic risk are associated with noise traders’ frenzy and limits to arbitrage (i.e., 
arbitrage risk).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review related 
literature and prior findings and present the testable hypotheses. Section III describes the 
data selection process and the measures of idiosyncratic volatility and equity mispricing. 
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Section IV explains the empirical methodologies, and reports univariate and multivariate 
test results. Section V contains additional tests and provides a more detailed investigation 
of the nature of the non-linear relation between idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing. 
The last section includes a summary and concluding remarks. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Roll (1988) points out that U.S. firms display low R-squares for common asset 
pricing models; the average R-square is about 20% for daily returns’ models and about 
35% when monthly returns are used. In the conclusion (p. 564) of his article, Roll 
proposes that this evidence seems to imply the existence of either “private information” 
or else “occasional frenzy” unrelated to concrete information. Using cross-country data, 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that stocks in countries with stronger property rights 
have higher idiosyncratic volatility. They argue that strong property rights promote 
informed arbitrage, leading to more firm-specific information and thus high idiosyncratic 
volatility. Durnev, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) find that firms and industries with greater 
idiosyncratic volatility display greater stock price informativeness. They define 
informativeness as the amount of information stock prices contain about future earnings, 
which they estimate from a regression of current stock returns against future earnings 
changes. They argue that if idiosyncratic volatility reflects the capitalization of private 
information into prices, high idiosyncratic volatility is a sign of active trading by 
informed arbitrageurs and implies that the stock price is tracking its fundamental value 
closely. In addition, Jin and Myers (2006) in a study involving stock returns from 40 
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countries over the 1990-2001 period test whether limited information (lack of 
transparency) can affect the division of risk bearing between inside managers and outside 
investors. They provide evidence consistent with the notion that if a firm is less 
transparent, insiders will be able to capture more firm-specific risk. Greater opaqueness 
leads to lower amounts of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside investors and therefore 
to lower levels of idiosyncratic volatility, i.e. high levels of R-square. In this context, 
outside investors have limited ability to evaluate changes in cash flows, and consequently 
their evaluation on equity value will be less accurate.  
Based on the above, the informed trading hypothesis predicts that idiosyncratic 
volatility and mispricing are negatively related because high idiosyncratic risk levels are 
associated with greater trading by informed arbitrageurs who trace firm’s fundamental 
value. 
On the other hand, in line with Roll’s alternative interpretation of idiosyncratic 
volatility as “occasional frenzy”, idiosyncratic volatility can reflect noise trading. For 
example, Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson (1985) show that firms with higher equity issuing 
costs have higher firm-specific daily stock return volatility, which is a proxy for 
asymmetric information between firm insiders and outsiders. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) use idiosyncratic volatility as one of measures of information 
asymmetry and find that firms engage in spin-offs to reduce information asymmetry. 
Kelly (2005) provides evidence that a low market model R-square (high idiosyncratic 
volatility) is indicative of a poor information environment with greater impediments to 
informed trade. If idiosyncratic volatility reflects greater impediments to informed trades 
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and/or informational asymmetry, then it should be associated with noise trading. In this 
view, named the noise trading hypothesis, it is predicted that the relationship of 
idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing is positive because in the presence of noise trading 
stock prices will deviate from fundamental value.  
In addition to the informed trading and noise trading interpretations of 
idiosyncratic risk, many authors share the view that idiosyncratic risk reflects risk related 
to costly arbitrage.2 For example, Pontiff (2005) points out that arbitrageurs are averse to 
trading when firms are idiosyncratic. This limit of arbitrage opportunity is also addressed 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Chen, Hong, and Stein 
(2002), who provide a possible explanation for persistent mispricing. In particular, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that any systematic mispricing could not be quickly and 
completely traded away if arbitrage costs exceed arbitrage benefits. Systematic 
mispricing may epitomize arbitrageurs’ limit of opportunity to perfectly hedge 
fundamental risk in their portfolios. Therefore, the prediction of the arbitrage risk 
hypothesis is that the mispricing of high arbitrage risk stocks should be higher than the 
mispricing of low arbitrage risk stocks. 
In sum, the informed trading hypothesis predicts a negative relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and equity mispricing, while the other two hypotheses (the noise 
trading hypothesis and the arbitrage risk hypothesis) predict a positive relation.  
                                                 
2 See, for example, (e.g., Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003), Pontiff and 
Schill (2003), Mendenhall (2004), and Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shelvin (2005)). 
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III. Data and Measures 
I extract return data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
where NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks are listed. The initial sample includes all firms 
in CRSP from 1980 to 2004, omitting financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-
4999) firms. I also exclude firms if their industry affiliation is not clear (i.e., SIC codes 
are missing). For the measure of idiosyncratic volatility, I use weekly stock returns. The 
choice of a weekly data is a compromise solution to the twin problems associated with a) 
the relatively low number of monthly observations, and b) the missing observations from 
non-trading occurrences in daily data (see Conrad and Kaul (1988)). Following Durnev et 
al. (2003 and 2004), I drop firms if they do not have complete return data over 52 weeks 
in a year to avoid problems associated with firms that experience IPOs, delisting, or 
trading halts. Accounting and financial data are drawn from COMPUSTAT. Firms with 
market value of equity less than $20 million are excluded in order to avoid cases of firms 
with distorted valuation multiples used in the construction of the mispricing measures. 
These requirements result in a final sample that includes 6,956 firms with 44,639 firm-
year observations covering the 25 year period from 1980 to 2004. 
 
A. Measures of Idiosyncratic Volatility 
I estimate R-square and idiosyncratic volatility variables for each stock for each 
calendar year using weekly data to regress stock returns on the returns of the market 
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index.3 Figure 1 illustrates how idiosyncratic volatility variables are measured using a 
time line.  
 
Figure 1 
Empirical Design of Time Line for Idiosyncratic Volatility and Equity Mispricing 
Measurements 
 
The above time line illustrates the methods used to compute idiosyncratic volatility measures and equity mispricing 
measures. Idiosyncratic volatility measures are computed using 52 weekly returns over each year t. Equity mispricing 
measures are computed at the mid time of each year (i.e., at the end of June in each year t).  
 
 
Mispricing variables (|EXVRI|, |EXVBO|, |EXVRK|, |EXVMB|, and MI) 
are measured at the end of June in year t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Year t 
 
Idiosyncratic volatility variables ( 2R , 2eσ , 2 2eσ σ , and ψ ) 
are measured using 52 weekly returns over year t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The regression model estimated for each stock i in year t is as follows: 
ri,w,t = αi,t + βi,t rm,w,t + ei,w,t, (1) 
where ri,w,t is the excess return for stock i on week w in year t, and rm,w,t is the value-
weighted excess market index return on the week w in year t. From this regression 
equation, the idiosyncratic variance is defined as 2 2 2 2, , , ,( )ie t i t im t m tσ σ σ σ= − , where 2,i tσ  = 
                                                 
3 In the robustness tests (Table 6), I also use idiosyncratic volatilities obtained from regressions of stock 
returns on returns of the market index and industry indices, or alternatively, on the three Fama and French 
factors. 
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2
,m tVar(ri,w,t), σ  = Var(rm,w,t), and σim,t = Cov(ri,w,t, rm,w,t). I compute each stock’s relative 
idiosyncratic volatility (i.e., the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility), 
2 2
, ,ie t i tσ σ 2,i tR or equivalently 1 – , for each year t. The relative idiosyncratic volatility is 
transformed to a logistic version as follows.  
2 2
, ,
, 2 2 2
, , ,
1
ln lni t ie ti t
i t i t ie t
R
R
σψ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                                                
. (2) 
Logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility (ψi,t) measures the ratio of unexplained 
variance to explained variance.4 Table 1 describes the R-square and idiosyncratic 
volatility variables, and Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for theses measures over 
the sample period, 1980 to 2004. I estimate volatility within each sample year t, yielding 
44,639 firm-year observations. The average R-square is about 0.152 which is very similar 
to that shown in other studies (e.g., 0.152 in Kelly (2005)) but lower than the average R-
squares of 0.20 and 0.35 computed from daily and monthly returns, respectively, reported 
in Roll (1988). This relatively low average R-square for my sample is consistent with the 
increase in idiosyncratic volatility observed over the recent years and reported in 
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001). In my sample, idiosyncratic volatility on 
average represents about 85% of total individual stock volatility, in line with Ferreira and 
Laux (2007) who also report an 85% average relative idiosyncratic volatility.  
 
4 In addition to logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility ( ,i tψ  or 
2
,
2 2
, ,
ie t
i t ie t
σ
σ σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
2
,ie t
ln ), I use idiosyncratic 
volatility (σ ) and relative idiosyncratic volatility ( 2 2, ,ie t i tσ σ ). All results in univariate and multivariate 
tests show consistent patterns.   
Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables  Descriptions
  
Idiosyncratic volatility measures 
2 R  R-square measured using a regression of stock returns on the returns of the market index, ri,w,t = αi,t + βi,t rm,w,t + ei,w,t, where ri,w,t is the excess 
return for stock i on week w in year t, and rm,w,t is the value-weighted excess market index return on the week w in year t.  
 2
eσ  Idiosyncratic volatility. From the regression, ri,w,t = αi,t + βi,t rm,w,t + ei,w,t, idiosyncratic variance is defined as 2 2 2 2, , , , , where ( )ie t i t im t m tσ σσ σ= − 2,i tσ  = 
Var(ri,w,t), 2 ,m tσ  = Var(rm,w,t), and σim,t = Cov(ri,w,t, rm,w,t). 
 2 2
eσ σ  Relative idiosyncratic volatility which is the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility, 2 2,,ie t i tσ σ  or equivalently 1 – 2,i tR . 
 ψ  
Logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility. 
2 2
, ,
, 2 2 2
, , ,
1
ln lni t ie ti t
i t i t ie t
R
R
σψ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. 
   
Mispricing measures 
 |EXVRI| Absolute value of excess value based on Ohlson’s (1995) residual income value approach. EXVRIit [ ]ln ( )it itPRICE I V= ,where PRICEit is the 
stock price at the end of June of each year from CRSP, and I(V)it is intrinsic value using the residual income model (Ohlson (1995)) and median 
values of analysts’ forecasts issued in June, as in Frankel and Lee (1998). 
 [ / (i t i tCPTL I CPTL=|EXVBO| Absolute value of excess value based on Berger and Ofek (1995) approach. EXVBOi,t ,) ] , where CPTLi,t is total capital, 
which is market value of equity plus book value of debt, I(CPTLi,t) is the imputed value derived as the product of firm sales and the median capital 
to size ratio in the firm’s industry. The industry classification here is based on the Fama-French 48 sectors. This measure of mispricing is 
constructed in a similar fashion as the first one (EXVRIi,t), but uses firm’s total capital instead of price and computes imputed value based on 
Fama-French 48 industry classification. Thus the intrinsic value here is a size and industry benchmark. 
,
 |EXVRK| Absolute value of the excess value based on Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Fundamental value, V is estimated by decomposing the market-to-book 
into two components: a measure of price to fundamentals (ln(M/V)), and a measure of fundamentals to book value (ln(V/B)). The first component 
captures the part of book-to-market associated with mispricing. This component is further decomposed into firm-specific and industry-specific 
misprising. I use the firm-specific mispricing component based on Model III of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) that also accounts for net income and 
leverage effects. ln(Mi,t)= α0j,t + α1j,t ln(Bi,t)+ α2j,t ln(NI)+i,t + α3j,t I(<0)ln(NI)+i,t + α4j,t ln(LEVi,t)+ ζi,t, where M is firm value, B is book value, NI+ is 
absolute value of net income, I(<0)ln(NI)+ is an indicator function for negative net income observations, and LEV is the leverage ratio.  
 |EXVMB| Absolute value of the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio. MBIAi,t , ,ln[ ( ) ]MB Med MBi t j t= , where, MBi,t is the market to book ratio for firm i 
at time t, and Med(MBj,t) is the jth  industry median of MBt.  
 MI Mispricing index which is constructed each year for each observation i = 1,…,N as: , where 
Rankk(|EXVi,k|) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation from least misvalued (rank of one) to most misvalued (rank of N). 
|EXVi,k| is the kth measure of mispricing for firm i in my sample, and K represents the dimensions of mispricing measures. The denominator, K, 
averages the ranks by the number of mispricing values available for each firm in the sample in a particular year. Finally, dividing by N, I scale the 
MI from 0 (least mispriced) to 1 (most mispriced).  
,(1/ )(1/ ) (| |)
K
i k i kk
MI N K RANK EXV= ∑
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Variables  Descriptions
   
Informativeness measure 
 PIN Annual probability of information-based trading of Easley et al. (1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b, 2002, 2005). /( )s bPIN αµ αµ ε ε= + + , where α is 
the probability and information event occurs, µ is the arrival rate of informed trades, , and sε  and bε  are the arrival rates of uninformed sells and 
buys respectively. αµ is the expected arrive rate of informed trades and s bαµ ε ε+ +  is the arrival rate for all orders.  
   
Uncertainty measures 
 EQ1 The first measure of earnings quality. Absolute value of firm-specific residuals from a Fama-French 48 annual industry regression of total accruals 
on the reciprocal of total assets, sales growth, and fixed assets. , ,1 2 3 ,
1TACCR PPESALES
, , , ,
i t i ti
i t
i t -1 i t -1 i t -1 i t -1
k k k
TA TA TA TA
ζ∆ + , where TACCRi,t 
, ) = firm i’s total accruals in year t, = change in current assets between year t-1 and 
year t, = change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t, 
= + +
( i t i t i t i t i tCA CL CASH STDEBT DEPN= ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ −, , , , ,i tCA∆
,i tCL∆ ,i tCASH∆ = change in cash between year t-1 and year t, ,i tSTDEBT∆ = 
change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and t, = depreciation and amortization expense in year t, ,i tDEPN iSALES∆ = change in sales 
between year t-1 and t, = property, plant, and equipment in year t, and = total assets in year t-1.  ,i tPPE ,i t -1TA
 EQ2 The second measure of earnings quality. Absolute value of firm-specific residuals from a Fama-French 48 annual industry regression of total 
accruals on lagged, contemporaneous, and leading cash flow from operations. , , , ,0 1 2 3 ,
TACCR CFO CFO CFOi t i t -1 i t i t+1
i t
i i i i
k k k k
TA TA TA TA
ζ= + + + + , where 
CFOi,t is firm i’s cash flow from operations in year t and computed as net income before extraordinary items minus total accruals. All variables are 
scaled by average total assets (TAi). 
 AFE Analyst earnings forecast error. , |, ,| ( ) | / | ( )i t i t i,t+1 i tMed AF EPS Med AFAFE = − , where forecast error, |Med(AF)i,t – EPSi,t+1|, is the absolute value 
of the difference between the median forecast (Med(AF)i,t) and the actual earnings per share (EPSi,t+1). 
 AFD Analyst earnings forecast dispersion. , |, ,. . / |i t i t i t( ) ( )AFD Std Dev AF Med AF= , where Std.Dev.(AF)i,t is standard deviation of one year ahead 
forecasts. 
 UI Firm uncertainty index. UI is computed each year for each observation i = 1,…,N as: , where 
Rankk(UNCERi,k) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation from least uncertain (rank of one) to most uncertain (rank of N). 
UNCERi,k is the kth measure of uncertainty for firm i in my sample, and K represents the dimensions of uncertainty measures (EQ1, EQ2, AFE, and 
AFD). The denominator, K, averages the ranks by the number of uncertainty values available for each firm in the sample in a particular year. 
Finally, dividing by N, I scale the TI from 0 (least uncertain) to 1 (most uncertain). 
,(1/ )(1/ ) ( )
K
i k i kk
UI N K RANK UNCER= ∑
 11
12
  
Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Variables Descriptions
   
Short-selling constraint measures 
 SIZE Log of total assets. 
 INSTP Institutional ownership. Percentage of shares held by institutions. 
 SI Short-selling constraint index. SI is constructed each year for each observation i = 1,…,N as: , where 
Rankk(SHORTi,k) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation from the lowest short-sale constraint (rank of one) to the highest 
short-sale constraint (rank of N). SHORTi,k is the inverse value of kth measure of short-sale constraint for firm i in my sample, and K represents the 
dimensions of short-sale constraint measures (SIZE and INSTP). The denominator, K, averages the ranks by the number of short-sale constraint 
values available for each firm in the sample in a particular year. Finally, dividing by N, I scale the SI from 0 (lowest short-sale constraint) to 1 
(highest short-sale constraint). 
,(1/ )(1/ ) ( )
K
i k i kk
SI N K RANK SHORT= ∑
   
Firm characteristics 
 LEV Leverage. The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
 ROA Return on assets. The ratio of net income to total assets. 
 AGE Firm age. AGE = ln(1+ age), where age is the number of years since the stock inclusion in the CRSP database. 
 DIVER Diversification dummy that equals one if a firm operates in multi-segments and zero otherwise. 
 DD Dividend-payer dummy that equals one if a firm pays dividends and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Reported are descriptive statistics for my sample firms. The sample contains 44,639 firm-year observations (6,956 
firms) over the period 1980 – 2004. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. 5% Median 95% 
Idiosyncratic volatility measures       
 R-square ( 2R ) 44,639 0.152 0.139 0.002 0.113 0.434 
 Idiosyncratic volatility ( 2σ e ) 44,639 0.004 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.013 
 Relative idiosyncratic volatility ( 2 2σ σe ) 44,639 0.848 0.139 0.566 0.887 0.998 
 Logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility (ψ ) 44,639 2.476 1.933 0.266 2.059 6.159 
Mispricing measures       
 Ohlson (1995) approach (|EXVRI|) 41,163 0.762 0.863 0.068 0.638 1.853 
 Berger and Ofek (1995) approach (|EXVBO|) 44,433 0.627 0.595 0.035 0.476 1.705 
 Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) approach (|EXVRK|) 44,637 0.369 0.345 0.024 0.275 1.047 
 Industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio (|EXVMB|) 44,639 0.390 0.370 0.017 0.288 1.125 
 Mispricing index (MI) 44,639 0.502 0.189 0.216 0.485 0.847 
Informativeness measure       
 Probability of information-based trading (PIN) 16,670 0.182 0.059 0.097 0.178 0.286 
Uncertainty measures       
 Francis et al. (2005) (EQ1) 33,314 0.332 0.593 0.014 0.166 1.082 
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) (EQ2) 28,879 0.170 0.565 0.012 0.111 0.469 
 Analyst earnings forecast error (AFE) 39,345 0.837 6.120 0.006 0.133 2.637 
 Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (AFD) 38,235 0.228 1.399 0 0.050 0.714 
 Uncertainty index (UI) 43,747 0.503 0.207 0.173 0.494 0.865 
Short-selling constraint measures       
 Firm size (SIZE) 44,639 19.74 1.658 17.36 19.54 22.77 
 Institutional ownership (INSTP) 30,399 0.503 0.244 0.093 0.512 0.892 
 Short-selling constraint index (SI) 44,639 0.507 0.260 0.107 0.496 0.929 
Firm characteristics       
 Leverage (LEV) 44,497 0.169 0.180 0 0.113 0.549 
 Return on assets (ROA) 44,639 0.035 0.115 -0.162 0.052 0.160 
 Firm age (AGE) 44,639 2.362 0.815 1.099 2.398 3.526 
 Diversification dummy (DIVER) 35,729 0.345 0.475 0 0 1 
 Dividend-payer dummy (DD) 42,942 0.432 0.495 0 0 1 
 
Next, to verify what Campbell et al. (2001) document as a secular decline in R-
squares in the U.S. market from 1960 to 1997, I compute annual average R-square and 
(logistic transformed) idiosyncratic volatility ( tψ ) and analyze the time trend by plotting 
them by year. Figure 2 shows clearly that annual average idiosyncratic volatility 
increases and equivalently annual average R-square declines. To verify this trend 
statistically, I run the simple regression of annual average tψ  on year, and find that the 
 13
coefficient of YEAR is 0.037 with t-statistic of 1.70. Abnormally high average R-square 
observed for 1987 can be attributed to the market crash in October 1987. 
 
Figure 2 
Time-series of Idiosyncratic Volatility and R-square 
 
This figure presents averages of annualized logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility ( tψ ) and R-square for the period 
from 1980 to 2004. The time-series relation is computed as the regression of tψ  on calendar year. The coefficient of 
YEAR is 0.037 with t-statistic of 1.70. 
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B. Measures of Mispricing 
Firm mispricing is measured as the deviation of a firm’s equity value from its 
intrinsic or fundamental value. I employ five alternative mispricing measures. The first 
four measures employ alternative techniques in estimating intrinsic value benchmarks, 
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while the last one is an index that combines all individual measures. The mispricing 
measures are:  
1) |EXVRIi,t|, the absolute value of the natural logarithm of the ratio between the stock 
price and its intrinsic value obtained from Ohlson’s (1995) residual income valuation 
model. EXVRI is computed at the end of June of each year. 
EXVRIi,t ,
,
ln
( )
i t
i t
PRICE
I V
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  (3) 
where PRICEi,t is the CRSP stock price at the end of June of each year, and I(V)i,t is 
the intrinsic value using the residual income model (Ohlson (1995)) with median 
values of analysts’ forecasts issued in June, as was done in Frankel and Lee (1998). 
There is strong empirical evidence in support of the residual income valuation ratio, 
V/P, as an indicator of mispricing.5   
2) |EXVBOi,t|, the absolute excess value computed at the end of June of each year as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio between a firm’s capital and its imputed value, based on 
the Berger and Ofek (1995) approach. 
EXVBOi,t ,
,
ln
( )
i t
i t
CPTL
I CPTL
⎡ ⎤= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎥
                                                
, (4) 
where CPTLi,t is total capital, which is market value of equity plus book value of 
debt, I(CPTLi,t) is the imputed value derived as the product of firm sales and the 
 
5 Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) report that V/P predicts one-month-ahead returns on the Dow 30 
stocks better than aggregate book-to-market. Frankel and Lee (1998) also show that the residual income 
value is a better predictor than book value of the cross-section of contemporaneous stock prices, and that 
V/P is a predictor of the one-year-ahead cross-section of returns. In addition, Ali et al. (2003) show that 
after controlling for several possible risk factors, V/P continues to significantly predict future returns. 
D’Mello and Shroff (2000) apply V/P to measure mispricing of equity repurchases, and Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, and Teoh (2006) to takeovers. 
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median capital to sales ratio in the firm’s primary industry. The industry classification 
here is based on the Fama-French 48 sectors. This measure of mispricing is 
constructed in a similar fashion as the first one (EXVRIi,t), but uses firm’s total capital 
instead of price and computes imputed value based on Fama-French 48 industry 
classification.  
3) |EXVRKi,t|, the absolute value of the firm-specific component of the difference 
between market value and fundamental value, based on the procedure outlined in 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). This procedure differs from the 
residual income valuation approach in the sense that it does not rely on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. According to Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), fundamental value, V is 
estimated by decomposing the market-to-book into two components: a measure of 
price to fundamentals (ln(M/V)), and a measure of fundamentals to book value 
(ln(V/B)). The first component captures the part of book-to-market associated with 
mispricing. In extreme cases where markets perfectly price stocks, this component 
would be equal to zero, otherwise positive (over-valuation) or negative (under-
valuation). This component is further decomposed into firm-specific and industry-
specific misprising. In my tests, I use the firm-specific mispricing component based 
on Model III of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) that also accounts for net income and 
leverage effects. 
ln(Mi,t) = α0j,t + α1j,t ln(Bi,t) + α2j,t ln(NI)+i,t + α3j,t I(<0)ln(NI)+i,t  
+ α4j,t ln(LEVi,t) + ζi,t  (5) 
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where M is firm value, B is book value, NI+ is absolute value of net income, 
I(<0)ln(NI)+ is an indicator function for negative net income observations, and LEV is 
the leverage ratio.  
4) |MBIAi,t|, the absolute value of the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio.  
MBIAi,t ,
,
ln
( )
i t
j t
MB
Med MB
⎡ ⎤= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥ , (6) 
where, MBi,t is the market to book ratio for firm i at time t, and Med(MBj,t) is the jth  
industry median of MBt. Several empirical studies have utilized MB as a mispricing 
measure (see, among others, Walkling and Edmister (1985), Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)). However, as Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) point out, the market to book ratio can be viewed as not only a 
proxy for misvaluation but also as a measure of future growth opportunities and 
managerial ability. 
5) MIi,t, a mispricing index (MI) that combines all four mispricing measures described 
above.6 The mispricing index (MI) is constructed each year for each observation i = 
1,…,N as: 
,
1 1 (| |)
K
i k
k
MI RANK EXV
N K
= ∑ i k
                                                
, (7) 
where Rankk(|EXVi,k|) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation 
from least misvalued (rank of one) to most misvalued (rank of N). |EXVi,k| is the kth 
measure of mispricing for firm i in the sample, and K represents the dimensions of 
 
6 In constructing MI, I employ the methodology outlined in Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005). In their 
paper, they create a liquidity index that aggregates the rankings of six different liquidity measures. 
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mispricing measures. The denominator, K, averages the ranks by the number of 
mispricing values available for each firm in the sample in a particular year. For 
example, the sum of the Rankk(|EXVi,k|) values of a firm that has only three mispricing 
measures is divided by K=3. Finally, dividing by N, I scale the MI from zero (least 
mispriced) to one (most mispriced). I argue that, since it is computed as the average 
of all available ranks from four different mispricing measures, MI provides a more 
complete picture of mispricing.  
Variable definitions and summary statistics for all measures are reported in Table 
1 and Table 2, respectively. Table 3 shows the coefficients of correlations between the 
different mispricing measures. As expected, all measures are positively correlated. The 
correlations are significant at the one percent level or better, despite the fact that these 
valuation measures are based on widely different theoretical concepts, measurement 
constructions and accounting/financial variables. I also find that generally individual 
mispricing measures are more significantly correlated with the mispricing index (MI) 
than with the other individual measures. This suggests that MI balances out the effects 
and shortcomings of the individual mispricing measures, while aggregating their 
informativeness. Therefore, MI is an appropriate aggregate measure of mispricing for use 
in the tests. For the most part, in this paper I present results based on MI for the sake of 
brevity. However, results obtained using the individual mispricing measures are 
qualitatively similar to those using MI.  
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Table 3 
Correlations Coefficients between Mispricing Measures 
 
This table shows the correlations coefficients between the mispricing measures, |EXVRI|, |EXVBO|, |EXVRK|, |MBIA|, 
and MI. The corresponding p-values are reported in brackets. All variables are as defined in Table 1. *** indicates 
significance at the 1%-level. 
 
 
Mispricing index 
(MI) 
Ohlson (1995) 
approach (|EXVRI|) 
Berger and Ofek 
(1995) approach 
(|EXVBO|) 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) approach 
(|EXVRK|) 
Ohlson (1995) 
approach (|EXVRI|) 
 
0.319*** 
[0.000] 
   
     
Berger and Ofek 
(1995) approach 
(|EXVBO|) 
0.523*** 
[0.000] 
0.083*** 
[0.000] 
  
     
Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) approach 
(|EXVRK|) 
0.713*** 
[0.000] 
0.174*** 
[0.000] 
0.252*** 
[0.000] 
 
     
Industry-adjusted 
market-to-book ratio 
(|EXVMB|) 
0.736*** 
[0.000] 
0.141*** 
[0.000] 
0.300*** 
[0.000] 
0.746*** 
[0.000] 
 
 
IV. Idiosyncratic Volatility and Equity Mispricing 
This section contains univariate analyses, a description of how I designed the 
empirical methodology, and regression evidence on the relation between idiosyncratic 
volatility and equity mispricing. 
 
A. Univariate Analyses 
Table 4 illustrates how high idiosyncratic risk firms differ from low idiosyncratic 
risk firms in terms of firm characteristics. It reports mean values of all variables used in 
the study for the quartile groups classified on the level of idiosyncratic volatility (ψ). 
Also reported are the mean differences between the two extreme groups (highest ψ versus 
lowest ψ quartiles) and the corresponding t-statistics for the mean difference tests. The 
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pattern of mean MI values across ψ quartiles is not consistent with a monotonic relation 
between MI and ψ. Average MI decreases in the first three sub-samples, Q1 through Q3, 
but finally increases in the quartile consisting of the highest idiosyncratic risk firms, Q4. 
This non-linear, U-shape relation is also shown in Figure 3.  
The evidence from the remaining variables is consistent with prior studies 
examining the relationship of firm characteristics and idiosyncratic risk. High 
idiosyncratic volatility firms are associated with high probability of information-based 
trading and greater uncertainty. In addition, high ψ firms have greater leverage and lower 
ROA, are younger, less diversified and less likely to pay dividends than low ψ firms.  
Moreover, idiosyncratic volatility is higher when short-selling constraints become more 
binding, consistent with the notion that idiosyncratic volatility captures arbitrage risk. 
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Table 4 
Univariate Tests 
 
Reported are mean values of variables for the quartile sub-samples sorted on the logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility (ψ ). Also reported are the differences in mean 
values between high- and low-ψ  firms and the corresponding t-statistics. All variables are as defined in Table 1. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level. 
 
  Sorted on the logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility (ψ ) 
   
   
Low 
Q1 Q2 Q3
High 
Q4 
Mean diff.: 
High - Low 
t-stat: 
Diff.=0 
Mispricing measures       
 Ohlson (1995) approach (|EXVRI|)       
       
       
      
       
     
0.785 0.749 0.744 0.770 -0.015 -1.16
 Berger and Ofek (1995) approach (|EXVBO|) 0.636 0.621 0.619 0.631 -0.004 -0.55
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) approach (|EXVRK|) 0.403 0.369 0.352 0.352 -0.051*** -10.72
 Industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio (|EXVMB|)
 
 0.416 0.391 0.376 0.376 -0.040*** -7.85
Mispricing index (MI) 0.513 0.499 0.495 0.499 -0.014***
 
-5.55
Informativeness measure 
 Probability of information-based trading (PIN) 0.163      
     
0.183 0.192 0.204 0.041***
 
32.98
Uncertainty measures 
 Francis et al. (2005) (EQ1)       
       
       
       
       
     
0.323 0.340 0.344 0.323 -0.0002 -0.02
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) (EQ2) 0.175 0.175 0.165 0.165 -0.010 -0.83
 Analyst earnings forecast error (AFE) 0.500 0.683 0.862 1.322 0.822*** 7.57
 Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (AFD)
 
0.147 0.208 0.258 0.319 0.172*** 8.15
Uncertainty index (UI) 0.464 0.499 0.515 0.535 0.071***
 
25.64
Short-selling constraint measures 
 Firm size (SIZE) 20.67      
       
       
     
19.82 19.40 19.06 -1.608*** -76.39
 Institutional ownership (INSTP) 0.579 0.527 0.473 0.422 -0.156*** -41.66
 Short-selling constraint index (SI) 0.368 0.482 0.556 0.624 0.256***
 
80.50
Firm characteristics 
 Leverage (LEV)       
       
      
       
        
0.146 0.161 0.176 0.192 0.046*** 19.19
 Return on assets (ROA)
 
0.054 0.039 0.028 0.020 -0.035*** -23.82
 Firm age (AGE) 2.602 2.381 2.268 2.196 -0.406*** -38.12
 Diversification dummy (DIVER) 0.416 0.343 0.321 0.301 -0.114*** -16.00
Dividend-payer dummy (DD) 0.556 0.442 0.389 0.338 -0.218*** -32.92
 
Figure 3 
Equity Mispricing by Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 
This figure presents averages of mispricing index (MI) for the quintile sub-samples sorted on the logistic relative 
idiosyncratic volatility (ψ ). 
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B. Multivariate Analyses 
Univariate tests can only provide limited, preliminary evidence on whether equity 
mispricing has truly a non-linear relationship with idiosyncratic volatility because a 
pattern could disappear after controlling for other factors that affect idiosyncratic 
volatility. Therefore, more tests in a multivariate setting are necessary to uncover the true 
relationship between mispricing and idiosyncratic volatility. I use the time-series average 
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of cross-sectional annual regressions as outlined in Fama and MacBeth (1973) and 
estimate the following model:7  
 MIit = β0 + β1 ψit + β2 SIZEit + β3 LEVit + β4 ROAit + β5 AGEit + β6 DIVERit  
                      + β7 DDit + µit, (8) 
where i indexes firms, t is a yearly time index, and ψit is a logistic transformation of 
relative idiosyncratic volatility. The control variables are market capitalization (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), firm age (AGE), a diversification dummy (DIVER), 
and a dividend-payer dummy (DD). Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table 1 
and descriptive statistics in Table 2. 
To examine whether there is a non-linear relation between idiosyncratic risk and 
mispricing, I include the second-order idiosyncratic volatility ( 2itψ ) in the model, resulting 
in the following equation.  
 MIit = β0 + β1 ψit + β2 2itψ  + β3 SIZEit + β4 LEVit + β5 ROAit + β6 AGEit 
                       + β7 DIVERit + β8 DDit + µit. (9) 
If the pattern observed in the univariate tests persists, the regression will show the 
significantly negative sign for the coefficient of first-order idiosyncratic volatility, β1, and 
positive sign for the coefficient of second-order, β2. If I find that β1 is significant and 
negative but β2 is insignificant, then my tests would lend support to the informed trading 
hypothesis only.  
                                                 
7 Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), I estimate separate annual regressions and calculate t-statistics as 
follows. 
ˆ
ˆ( ) ˆ( ) 1
j
j
j
t
s n
ββ β= − , where 
ˆ
jβ  is the mean coefficient over the sample years, ˆ( )js β  is the 
standard deviation of the yearly estimates, and n is the number of years. 
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The results of the multivariate tests appear in Table 5. In Panel A, I report results 
of regressions using the mispricing index (MI, columns [1] and [2]) and the logistic-
transformed mispricing index (columns [3] and[4]) as dependent variables.8 In Panel B, I 
show regression results using the four individual mispricing measures as dependent 
variables. The results in Panel A show a significant negative relation between 
idiosyncratic risk and mispricing, suggesting that higher idiosyncratic volatility is 
strongly associated with lower level of equity mispricing. In column [1], for example, the 
estimated coefficient of idiosyncratic volatility is -0.004 with t-statistic of -3.36. However, 
more importantly, the coefficients of second-order idiosyncratic volatility in columns [2] 
and [4] are significantly positive (e.g., 0.002 with t-statistic of 6.01 in column [2]) 
without reducing the significance in the first-order ψ coefficient. The evidence in Panel B 
based on the individual mispricing measures is qualitatively similar to that using the 
mispricing index. The ψ and ψ2 coefficients are always negative and positive, 
respectively, and significant in almost all cases. 
This evidence provides room for two important interpretations. First, consistent 
with the informed trading hypothesis, the significant and negative sign for the first-order 
relation supports the notion that higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility signal more 
information-laden stock prices. Second, the significant positive sign for the second-order 
coefficient combined with the significant negative sign for the first-order coefficient 
implies that the informed trading hypothesis view of idiosyncratic volatility does not hold 
                                                 
8 This transformation is to guard against a possibility that mispricing index (MI) which takes value from 0 
to 1 can lead to erroneous interpretation of results. I find that the results are, as shown, very similar to ones 
obtained from the original regressions. 
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for firms with very high levels of idiosyncratic risk. The positive relation between 
mispricing and idiosyncratic volatility beyond a certain point could be driven by the 
predominance of uninformed noise traders and/or by the inability of arbitrageurs to find 
close substitutes for high idiosyncratic volatility firms when they want to hedge 
fundamental risk. Both of these two effects are consistent with increases in mispricing for 
high levels of idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
Table 5 
Idiosyncratic Volatility and Equity Mispricing 
 
This table shows time-series average of cross-sectional regressions of mispricing on idiosyncratic volatility and other 
firm characteristics. Panel A reports results of regressions using mispricing index (MI) or logistic mispricing index as 
dependent variable, while Panel B reports results of regressions using individual mispricing measure as dependent 
variable. All variables are as defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is mispricing index (MI) or logistic mispricing index. 
 Dep. var. = MI  Dep. var. = ln(1+MI) 
 [1] Linear [2] Non-linear  [3] Linear [4] Non-linear 
Intercept 0.652*** 
(19.74) 
0.704*** 
(21.58) 
 0.497*** 
(22.69) 
0.530*** 
(24.15) 
      
Logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility (ψ ) -0.004*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.017*** 
(-7.45) 
 -0.003*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.011*** 
(-6.86) 
      
2ψ   0.002*** 
(6.01) 
  0.001*** 
(5.72) 
      
Log of total assets (SIZE) -0.002 
(-0.91) 
-0.003* 
(-2.04) 
 -0.001 
(-0.93) 
-0.002* 
(-1.99) 
      
Leverage (LEV) -0.211*** 
(-11.10) 
-0.205*** 
(-10.93) 
 -0.136*** 
(-10.75) 
-0.133*** 
(-10.56) 
      
Return on assets (ROA) 0.111* 
(1.80) 
0.105* 
(1.74) 
 0.069 
(1.68) 
0.063 
(1.59) 
      
Log of firm age (AGE) -0.025*** 
(-9.89) 
-0.025*** 
(-9.89) 
 -0.016*** 
(-9.63) 
-0.016*** 
(-9.65) 
      
Diversification dummy (DIVER) -0.030*** 
(-11.22) 
-0.030*** 
(-11.17) 
 -0.019*** 
(-10.55) 
-0.019*** 
(-10.49) 
      
Dividend-payer dummy (DD) -0.038*** 
(-10.13) 
-0.205*** 
(-10.93) 
 -0.025*** 
(-10.19) 
-0.024*** 
(-10.29) 
N 34,471 34,471  34,471 34,471 
Average R2 11.96% 12.27%  11.50% 11.79% 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is individual mispricing measure. 
 Dep. var. = |EXVRI|  Dep. var. = |EXVBO|  Dep. var. = |EXVRK|  Dep. var. = |EXVMB| 
    [1]  
Linear 
[2]  
Non-linear 
[3]  
Linear 
[4]  
Non-linear 
[5]  
Linear 
[6]  
Non-linear 
[7]  
Linear 
[8]  
Non-linear 
Intercept        0.689***
(4.60) 
0.756*** 
(4.28) 
0.595***
(14.01) 
0.650*** 
(12.86) 
0.586***
(14.37) 
0.682*** 
(14.89) 
0.851***
(19.46) 
0.959*** 
(20.30) 
            ψ  -0.003 
(-0.45) 
-0.025 
(-1.62) 
      
     
2
-0.006*
(-1.78) 
 
-0.020** 
(-2.33) 
-0.008***
(-4.94) 
 
-0.031*** 
(-6.66) 
-0.012***
(-5.89) 
 
-0.037*** 
(-7.43) 
    
ψ             
   
        
 
       
    
       
   
        
 
        
 
       
         
0.003**
(2.18) 
0.002
(1.30) 
0.003***
(4.64) 
0.003***
(5.77) 
 
0.015**
 
0.013***
   
0.011*** 
 
-0.005** 
 
-0.013***
  
SIZE
(2.40) 
0.013* 
(1.92) (6.05) 
 
(4.86) 
-0.001
(-0.66) (-2.48) (-6.10) 
 
-0.017*** 
(-7.95) 
 
-0.389***
 
 -0.378*** 
   
-0.246*** 
 
-0.392***
 
-0.382*** 
  
LEV
(-5.15) (-5.15) 
-0.252***
(-4.82) 
 
(-4.77) (-10.49) (-10.55) 
-0.317***
(-9.72) 
 
-0.305*** 
(-9.71) 
 
-1.550***
 
 -1.556*** 
 
0.306***
 
0.295*** 
  
ROA
(-5.97) (-6.00) 
-0.013
(-0.09) 
 
-0.021 
(-0.14) (4.32) (4.18) 
0.815***
(6.45) 
 
0.804*** 
(6.38) 
   
-0.068*** 
 
-0.037***
 
-0.037*** 
  
AGE -0.028
(-1.38) 
-0.027 
(-1.37) 
-0.068***
(-10.93) 
 
(-10.91) 
   
(-13.92) (-13.50) 
-0.053***
(-13.12) 
 
-0.054*** 
(-13.00) 
 
-0.030***
 
-0.029*** 
 
-0.037***
 
-0.037*** 
  
DIVER
(-3.26) (-3.21) 
-0.045***
(-5.61) 
 
-0.045*** 
(-5.76) (-9.25) (-9.43) 
-0.052***
(-17.91) 
 
-0.052*** 
(-17.58) 
 
-0.078***
 
 -0.075*** 
   
-0.061*** 
 
-0.076***
 
-0.074*** 
  
DD
(-5.46) (-5.39) 
-0.063***
(-8.42) (-8.37) (-12.41) 
 
(-12.74) 
 
-0.060***
(-8.43) 
-0.058*** 
(-8.47) 
N 31,420 31,420  33,707 33,707 33,751 33,751 33,751 33,751
Average R2           7.01% 7.27%  5.18% 5.37% 12.02% 12.37% 15.05% 15.37%
 
In order to better identify the size and composition of the group of firms 
belonging to the right-hand of the U-shape curve, I compute the inflection point using the 
coefficients of first- and second-order terms of volatility obtained from estimating the 
non-linear regression models. I find that the inflection point is far to the right of the ψ 
distribution, indicating that mispricing declines with ψ for most of firms. For example, 
the relation between MI and ψ is inflected at a ψ of 4.930 (equivalently, idiosyncratic 
volatility (1 – 2R ) of 99.28%) in regression model [2]. Even though idiosyncratic risk of 
that magnitude is extremely high, the number of observations with ψ values greater than 
the inflection point is not negligible. The total number of firms residing on the right-hand 
side of the U-shape curve accounts for about 10% of the total firm-year observations (i.e., 
3,388 out of 34,471).  
Overall the evidence from Table 5 suggests that in most cases (about 90%), higher 
idiosyncratic risk implies that the activity of informed traders leads to lower equity 
mispricing, but that in the presence of extremely high idiosyncratic risk levels the effects 
of noise and/or arbitrage risk cause higher mispricing. 
 
C. Robustness Tests 
In this sub-section I conduct several robustness checks, which aim at determining 
whether or not the findings in Table 5 are due to the particular model of returns used to 
estimate idiosyncratic volatility or to the estimation methodology used. 
I start my robustness tests by using alternative idiosyncratic volatility measures. 
First, I re-estimate idiosyncratic volatility by adding each firm’s industry returns into the 
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market model (equation (1)) as was suggested by other authors (e.g., Durnev et al. (2003 
and 2004) and Kelly (2005)). The Fama-French 48 industry SIC classification code is 
used to define the industry. Second, I use idiosyncratic volatility estimates from the 
Fama-French three-factor model of returns. Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, and 
1996) suggest that a three-factor model explains the time-series of stock returns. The 
three Fama-French factors are the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio, 
Rm, the return on a zero investment portfolio measured as the difference between the 
return on a large firm portfolio and the return on a small firm portfolio, SMB, and the 
return on a zero investment portfolio estimated as the return on a portfolio of high book-
to-market minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, HML. Third, in 
order to solve the problem that arises with cross-sectional time series models when 
differences between firms are regarded as parametric shifts of the regression function, I 
use a fixed-effects model to control for possible differences across firms. Fourth, I 
compute difference-in-differences estimates by including year fixed-effects as well as 
firm fixed-effects. Fifth, I compute statistical significances using White’s (1980) standard 
errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity. Finally, I estimate a model using only the 
first-year observation of each firm. This check with the test that uses first-year data only 
allows me to see whether previous results are not driven by multiple observations on the 
same firms.  
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Table 6 
Robustness Checks of Regression of Equity Mispricing on Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 
This table reports robustness checks of regressions of mispricing on idiosyncratic volatility and other firm characteristics. Reported are the coefficients and t-statistics of 
regression models [3] and [4] in Table V which use log-transformed mispricing index, ln(1+MI), as a dependent variable. Columns [1] and [2] report results using 
idiosyncratic volatility estimates from a model controlling market returns and industry returns according to the Fama-French 48 industry SIC classification. Columns [3] 
and [4] report results using idiosyncratic volatility estimates from Fama-French three-factor model of returns. Columns [5] and [6] report results using panel regressions. 
Columns [7] and [8] report results of regressions computing difference-in-difference estimates (i.e., including firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects). Columns [9] and 
[10] report results using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity correction model. Columns [11] and [12] report results only using the first-year data of each firm. All 
variables are as defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Industry model Fama-French model Panel regression model Difference-in-differences White (1980) model First-year regression 
 [1]  
Linear 
[2]  
Non-linear 
[3]  
Linear 
[4]  
Non-linear 
[5]  
Linear 
[6]  
Non-linear 
[7]  
Linear 
[8]  
Non-linear 
[9]  
Linear 
[10]  
Non-linear 
[11]  
Linear 
[12]  
Non-linear 
Intercept  0.539***
(22.81) 
0.591*** 
(24.60) 
0.508*** 
(23.51) 
0.530*** 
(24.30) 
0.770*** 
(34.79) 
0.780*** 
(35.11) 
0.823*** 
(31.77) 
0.838*** 
(32.14) 
0.530*** 
(28.90) 
0.549*** 
(29.67) 
0.525*** 
(18.61) 
0.557*** 
(19.19) 
             ψ  
2
-0.006*** -0.019*** 
(-6.27) 
 
(-9.89) 
 
-0.006*** 
(-4.61) 
 
-0.019*** 
(-6.07) 
 
-0.001*** 
(-3.03) 
 
-0.004*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.65) 
   
-0.005*** 
(-5.59) 
-0.004*** 
(-9.75) 
-0.010*** 
(-9.35) 
   
-0.007*** 
(-8.12) 
-0.016*** 
(-7.56) 
  
ψ              
  
 
             
0.003***
(7.99) 
0.004***
(4.36) 
0.0004***
(4.86) 
0.0004***
(4.93) 
0.001***
(6.20) 
0.001***
(4.55) 
 
-0.003** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
-0.002* 
 
-0.017*** 
   
-0.019*** 
   
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003** SIZE 
(-2.55) 
 
(-4.26) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.34) 
 
(-1.99) 
 
(-12.81) 
 
-0.017*** 
(-13.04) (-12.77) 
   
-0.019*** 
(-13.14) 
-0.002** 
(-2.39) (-3.00) 
   
-0.002 
(-1.39) (-2.02) 
  
LEV -0.132*** 
(-10.46) 
 
-0.126*** 
(-9.99) 
 
-0.135*** 
(-10.56) 
 
-0.133*** 
(-10.35) 
 
-0.055*** 
(-8.90) 
 
-0.054*** 
(-8.73) 
-0.057*** 
(-8.92) 
   
-0.055*** 
(-8.58) 
-0.162*** 
(-24.47) 
-0.160*** 
(-24.17) 
   
-0.187*** 
(-18.20) 
-0.183*** 
(-17.68) 
  
ROA 0.062 
(1.58) 
0.059 
(1.51) 
0.065 
(1.63) 
0.064 
(1.60) 
-0.009 
(-1.25) 
 
-0.010 
(-1.39) 
-0.012 
(-1.63) 
   
-0.014* 
(-1.81) 
-0.047*** 
(-5.42) 
-0.048*** 
(-5.47) 
   
-0.071*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.072*** 
(-5.75) 
   
-0.016*** 
 
-0.016*** 
 
-0.016*** 
 
-0.016*** AGE 
(-9.98) 
 
(-10.26) 
 
(-9.73) 
 
(-9.61) 
 
-0.013*** 
(-6.25) 
 
-0.013*** 
(-6.11) 
-0.018*** 
(-6.62) 
   
-0.018*** 
(-6.58) 
-0.014*** 
(-8.94) 
-0.014*** 
(-9.01) 
   
-0.005* 
(-1.80) 
-0.006** 
(-2.20) 
  
DIVER -0.019*** 
(-10.31) 
 
-0.019*** 
(-10.11) 
 
-0.019*** 
(-10.50) 
 
-0.019*** 
(-10.42) 
 
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.00004 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(-1.29) 
   
-0.003 
(-1.40) 
-0.017*** 
(-6.60) 
-0.018*** 
(-6.74) 
   
-0.022*** 
(-5.04) 
-0.023*** 
(-5.21) 
  
DD -0.024*** 
(-9.67) 
-0.024*** 
(-9.50) 
-0.025*** 
(-9.99) 
-0.024*** 
(-9.92) 
-0.003 
(-0.99) 
-0.003 
(-1.07) 
-0.002 
(-0.80) 
-0.003 
(-0.85) 
-0.018*** 
(-6.19) 
-0.018*** 
(-6.26) 
-0.011** 
(-2.43) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.57) 
N 34,468 34,468 34,471 34,471 34,471 34,471 34,471 34,471 34,471 34,471 5,284 5,284
R2             11.63% 12.12% 11.54% 11.80% 5.74% 5.90% 5.81% 5.93% 10.08% 10.23% 11.40% 11.75%
 
The results of these robustness checks are reported in Table 6. To save space, 
Table 6 only reports the results of regression models [3] and [4] in Table 5, which use 
log-transformed msipricing index, ln(1+MI), as a dependent variable.9 I find that all 
regressions show a consistent pattern of coefficients on the estimates of idiosyncratic 
volatility. The first- and second-order coefficients remain significantly negative and 
positive, respectively. Therefore, the previous results are confirmed by these various 
robustness checks.  
The univariate and multivariate tests on the relation between idiosyncratic 
volatility and equity mispricing have provided evidence that idiosyncratic volatility can 
imply informed trading as well as noise trading and/or arbitrageurs’ risk. This evidence 
can be confirmed by focusing on “information flow” and examining whether the 
probability of information-based trading (PIN) is strongly related to idiosyncratic 
volatility. Recent research has utilized the probability of information-based trading (PIN) 
to proxy private information flow. According to Easley et al. (1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 
1997b, 2002, and 2005), the PIN is estimated as the ratio of expected informed order flow 
to total order flow: 
s b
PIN αµαµ ε ε= + + ,  (10) 
where α is the probability that an information event occurs, µ is the arrival rate of 
informed trades, and sε  and bε  are the arrival rates of uninformed sells and buys 
respectively. αµ is the expected arrive rate of informed trades and s bαµ ε ε+ +  is the 
                                                 
9 I obtain similar results to the ones presented here when I repeat the tests using the individual mispricing 
measures. These results are available upon request. 
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arrival rate for all orders. Consequently, the ratio is the fraction of orders that arise from 
informed traders or the probability that the opening trade is information based.10  
PIN is expected to be related to idiosyncratic volatility according to three 
hypotheses established for the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and equity 
mispricing. The informed trading hypothesis regards idiosyncratic risk as a sign of active 
trading by informed traders, and thus predicts that probability of information-based 
trading (PIN) should be higher for high idiosyncratic volatility firm (i.e., positive relation 
between PIN and idiosyncratic volatility). The noise trading hypothesis regards 
idiosyncratic volatility as a sign of uninformed traders’ noise trading, and thus predicts 
the negative relation between PIN and idiosyncratic volatility. The arbitrage risk 
hypothesis regards idiosyncratic volatility as a sign of limited opportunities for informed 
traders to arbitrage, and thus predicts the negative relation between PIN and idiosyncratic 
volatility. If the evidence of U-shape relation between mispricing and idiosyncratic 
volatility from Table 5 is true and supported by the analysis using PIN, the relation 
between PIN and idiosyncratic volatility is expected to be non-linear, i.e., have a concave 
shape.  
To test the above predictions, I estimate the following regression equation using 
the private information flow proxy (PIN) as dependent variable: 
 PINit = β0 + β1 ψit + β2 SIZEit + β3 LEVit + β4 ROAit + β5 AGEit + β6 DIVERit  
+ β7 DDit + µit, (11) 
 PINit = β0 + β1 ψit + β2 2itψ  + β3 SIZEit + β4 LEVit + β5 ROAit + β6 AGEit 
                                                 
10 The yearly PIN estimates are available on Soeren Hvidkjaer’s web site: 
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/data.htm 
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+ β7 DIVERit + β8 DDit + µit. (12) 
I report these regression results in Table 7. Columns [1] and [2] display the results 
of models using the raw PIN as dependent variable, while columns [3] and [4] show 
results when a log-transformed version, ln(1+PIN), is used. PIN is found to be positively 
related to the idiosyncratic volatility, which supports the informed trading hypothesis that 
high idiosyncratic risk is caused by informed arbitrageurs who trade in stocks using 
private information to trace fundamental firm value. The conjecture is that high 
idiosyncratic volatility stocks are associated with high private information-based trading. 
This evidence is in line with the findings of other authors. For example, Kelly (2005) 
finds that PIN is higher for low R-square (i.e., high idiosyncratic risk) firms. Ferreira and 
Laux (2007) show that PIN is negatively correlated with the governance index which, in 
turn, is negatively correlated with idiosyncratic volatility.  Their findings also imply a 
positive relation between PIN and idiosyncratic volatility. 
Regression results for models that include the second-order idiosyncratic 
volatility also reveal a non-linear relation between PIN and volatility. Thus, while the 
coefficient of ψ  is positive, the coefficient of 2ψ  is negative. Moreover, both coefficients 
are significant. This finding is in line with the evidence that mispricing increases beyond 
a certain high level of idiosyncratic volatility. Accordingly, the non-linear relation is 
inflected at the idiosyncratic volatility (1 – 2R ) of 99.75%, and the number of 
observations after the inflection point accounts for 568 firms (about 5%) of firm-year 
observations used in the regression (11,741 firms). The inflection point is similar to the 
one on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing in Table 5. The U-
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shape was inflected at the idiosyncratic volatility (1 – 2R ) of 99.28% and about 10% of 
observations were included in the right side of U-shape curve. 
 
Table 7 
Idiosyncratic Volatility and Information-based Trading 
 
This table shows time-series average of cross-sectional regressions of probability of information-based trading on 
idiosyncratic volatility and other firm characteristics. All variables are as defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dep. var. = PIN  Dep. var. = ln(1+PIN) 
 [1] Linear [2] Non-linear  [3] Linear [4] Non-linear 
Intercept 0.219*** 
(52.28) 
0.210*** 
(53.52) 
 0.198*** 
(57.16) 
0.190*** 
(59.24) 
      
Logistic relative idiosyncratic volatility (ψ ) 0.007*** 
(8.30) 
0.012*** 
(11.76) 
 0.006*** 
(8.53) 
0.010*** 
(11.97) 
      
2ψ   -0.001** 
(-2.67) 
  -0.001*** 
(-3.08) 
      
Log of total assets (SIZE) -0.023*** 
(-27.43) 
-0.027*** 
(-27.90) 
 -0.019*** 
(-27.19) 
-0.019*** 
(-27.54) 
      
Leverage (LEV) 0.012*** 
(3.91) 
0.011*** 
(3.66) 
 0.010*** 
(3.89) 
0.009*** 
(3.64) 
      
Return on assets (ROA) -0.045*** 
(-5.31) 
-0.041*** 
(-5.01) 
 -0.038*** 
(-5.38) 
-0.035*** 
(-5.07) 
      
Log of firm age (AGE) -0.013*** 
(-10.53) 
-0.012*** 
(-10.27) 
 -0.011*** 
(-10.37) 
-0.010*** 
(-10.13) 
      
Diversification dummy (DIVER) -0.010*** 
(-8.42) 
-0.010*** 
(-7.89) 
 -0.009*** 
(-8.51) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.97) 
      
Dividend-payer dummy (DD) -0.004 
(-1.62) 
-0.003 
(-1.51) 
 -0.003* 
(-1.71) 
-0.003 
(-1.60) 
N 11,741 11,471  11,741 11,741 
Average R2 38.67% 39.30%  39.48% 40.14% 
 
However, the results from Table 7 do not provide us with a clear answer to the 
question of why the level of equity mispricing increases for very high volatility firms. It 
could be because uninformed noise traders dominate trading for highly volatile firms, or 
because high ψ  firms are associated with arbitrage risk. Consequently, in order to further 
investigate the above question I will repeat the multivariate tests using different sub-
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samples where noise trading and/or arbitrage risk are more (or less) likely. This analysis 
is conducted in the coming section. 
 
V. Interpretations on the Non-linear Relationship 
To answer to the question of why mispricing rises with idiosyncratic volatility for 
high volatility stocks, I create sub-samples consisting of stocks classified based on 
whether they are more or less likely to have noise trading as well as whether they are 
more or less likely to display arbitrage risk. First, I use uncertainty11 as a measure of 
probability of low/high noise trading, by assuming that if a firm’s information 
environment is less uncertain, the market participants for these stocks are better informed 
and thus there are relatively fewer noise traders compared to other stocks. Second, I use 
short-sale constraints as a measure of the extent of arbitrage risk. The use of the short-
selling constraints as a proxy for the likelihood of arbitrage risk relies on the assumption 
that informed traders have a better opportunity to engage into arbitrage when short-
selling constraints are less binding. In the following sub-sections, I describe how I 
computed aggregate measures of firm uncertainty and short-selling constraints from a 
number of proxies. 
 
A. Measures of Firm’s Uncertainty 
To measure uncertainty, I focus on the measures of earnings quality, captured by 
the absolute size of abnormal accruals, and on measures of the quality of security 
                                                 
11 Black (1986) argues that noise caused by uncertainty makes it difficult for either practitioners or 
academic researchers to understand how financial or economic markets work. 
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analysts’ forecasts. Abnormal accruals (i.e., accruals larger or smaller than expected) 
reflect poor earnings quality, which is likely to occur in the presence of uncertainty. I use 
two measures based on Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) and Dechow and 
Dichev (2002). The first measure of earnings quality (EQ1) is defined as the absolute 
value of firm-specific residuals from an industry regression of total accruals on the 
reciprocal of total assets, sales growth, and fixed assets.  
,
1 2 3
, , , ,
1i t i ti
i t
i t -1 i t-1 i t-1 i t-1
TACCR PPESALESk k k
TA TA TA TA
,
,ζ∆= + + + , (13) 
where TACCRi,t = firm i’s total 
accruals in year t, = change in current assets between year t-1 and year t, 
, , , ,( )i t i t i t i t i tCA CL CASH STDEBT DEPN= ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ,
,i tCA∆ ,i tCL∆ = 
change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t, ,i tCASH∆ = change in cash 
between year t-1 and year t, ,i tSTDEBT∆ = change in debt in current liabilities between 
year t-1 and t, = depreciation and amortization expense in year t, = 
change in sales between year t-1 and t, = property, plant, and equipment in year t, 
and = total assets in year t-1.  
,i tDEPN iSALES∆
,i tPPE
,i t -1TA
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) I also create an alternative earnings quality 
(EQ2) measure, which is the absolute value of firm-specific residuals from the regression 
of total accruals on lagged, contemporaneous, and leading cash flow from operations.  
, , , ,
0 1 2 3
i t i t-1 i t i t+1
i t
i i i i
TACCR CFO CFO CFO
k k k k
TA TA TA TA ,
ζ= + + + + , (14) 
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where CFOi,t is firm i’s cash flow from operations in year t and computed as net income 
before extraordinary items minus total accruals. All variables are scaled by average total 
assets (TAi).  
I also use two variables constructed from non-stale security analyst one fiscal 
year-ahead forecasts, issued every June and extracted from I/B/E/S Detail History 
Database. These are the absolute value of the analyst forecast error (AFE) and the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts (AFD). The forecast error captures forecasting ability of 
security analysts covering the firm. The absolute value of the forecast error has been also 
used by several studies as a proxy of information asymmetry (e.g., see Atiase and 
Bamber (1994), and Christie (1987)). If there is less uncertainty, a considerable amount 
of information about future earnings is available to market participants, and so analysts 
should be in better position to make accurate earnings forecasts. Barron, Kim, Lim and 
Stevens (1998) show that analyst forecast dispersion reflects both diversity of analyst 
beliefs and the uncertainty (lack of precision) in analyst forecasts. Prior studies have used 
the dispersion of analyst forecasts as an information uncertainty proxy (e.g., see Zhang 
(2005)), as well as an information asymmetry proxy (e.g., see Krisnhnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999)). Therefore, I expect analyst forecast error and dispersion will 
increase with uncertainty. AFE and AFD are computed as follows: 
, ,
,
,
( )
( )
i t i t+1
i t
i t
| Med AF EPS |
AFE =
| Med AF |
−
, (15) 
,
,
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i t
i t
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| Med AF |
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where forecast error, |Med(AF)i,t – EPSi,t+1|, is the absolute value of the difference 
between the median analyst forecast (Med(AF)i,t) and the actual earnings per share 
(EPSi,t+1), while Std.Dev.(AF)i,t is standard deviation of one year ahead analyst forecasts.  
All four aforementioned variables (EQ1, EQ2, AFE, and AFD) are positively 
related to uncertainty. Thus, I construct an uncertainty index (UI) for each firm by 
combining the inverse ranks of the four variables. The methodology used to construct UI 
is the same as the one used for the mispricing index (MI). UI is computed each year for 
each observation i = 1,…,N as: 
,
1 1 (
K
i k
k
UI RANK UNCER
N K
= ∑ )i k , (17) 
where Rankk(UNCERi,k) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation 
from least uncertain (rank of one) to most uncertain (rank of N). UNCERi,k is the kth 
measure of uncertainty for firm i in my sample, and K represents the dimensions of 
uncertainty measures (EQ1, EQ2, AFE, and AFD). The denominator, K, averages the 
ranks by the number of uncertainty values available for each firm in the sample in a 
particular year. Finally, dividing by N, I scale the UI from 0 (least uncertain) to 1 (most 
uncertain). Table 1 provides detail descriptions of uncertainty measures and Table 2 
documents descriptive statistics. 
 
B. Measures of Short-selling Constraints 
I control for the effects of short-sale constraints using two alternative proxies: size 
(SIZE), and institutional ownership (IO). I also construct an aggregate measure, a short-
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sale costs index (SI). Previous research suggests firm size as a short-selling characteristic 
(see Chen et al. (2002), and Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) among others). The 
supply of shortable shares for small firms is generally low because small capitalization 
stocks tend to be held primarily by individual investors who rarely lend their shares. 
Furthermore, outstanding shares of small firms are not necessarily floated since insiders 
may hold a considerable portion of the shares outstanding. Large capitalization firms, 
however, are held more widely, and so finding a lender of shares should be less difficult. 
Shares of small firms are also less likely to be “on special” than those of large firms 
(Reed (2003)). Finally, search and bargaining costs involved in short-selling are more 
likely to be higher in small firms than in large ones. Therefore, based on the above 
arguments, the cost of borrowing and shorting small capitalization stocks is expected to 
be higher than in large capitalization stocks.  
As a second proxy for short-selling constraints, I use institutional ownership 
(INSTP). D’Avolio (2002) shows that institutional ownership is the major determinant of 
the quantity of shares supplied to the market. Therefore, the cost of short-selling should 
be less (more) expensive for stocks with high (low) institutional ownership. Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) report a strong relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity. 
This suggests that the cost of trading large quantities of shares for stocks with high 
institutional ownership should be low. The search and bargaining cost for stocks with 
high institutional ownership is also expected to be low. Indeed, if several institutional 
investors are lending many shares, it should be less costly to locate them and competition 
should lower the cost of direct borrowing. Finally, derivative instruments, and in 
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particular put options, an alternative method of creating short positions, are likely to be 
more often available for stocks with high levels of institutional shareholdings.12 
Therefore, stocks with low institutional ownership are subject to a higher short-selling 
cost. 
Finally, a short-selling constraints index (SI) is constructed using the inverse of 
both firm size and institutional ownership (see also Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006)). 
SI is computed each year for each observation i = 1,…,N as: 
,
1 1 (
K
i k
k
SI RANK SHORT
N K
= ∑ )i k
                                                
, (18) 
where Rankk(SHORTi,k) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation 
from the lowest short-sale constraint (rank of one) to the highest short-sale constraint 
(rank of N). SHORTi,k is the inverse value of kth measure of short-sale constraint for firm i 
in my sample, and K represents the dimensions of short-sale constraint measures (SIZE 
and INSTP). The denominator, K, averages the ranks by the number of short-sale 
constraint values available for each firm in the sample in a particular year. Finally, 
dividing by N, I scale the SI from 0 (lowest short-sale constraint) to 1 (highest short-sale 
constraint). Details of all short-selling variables are provided in Table 1 and summary 
statistics are documented in Table 2. 
 
 
12 Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2004) show that the violation of the put-call parity is strongly related to 
lending fees. Lending fees, however, are related to institutional ownership. 
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I begin my analysis of the non-linear relationship by comparing the mean values 
of uncertainty and short-selling constraint measures across firms that belong to the left-
hand side and the right-hand side of the U-shape relationship between MI and ψ . The 
comparison is presented in Table 8. In the left half of the table I present evidence based 
on the sample used in the main multivariate test presented in Table 5, which had 34,471 
observations. The results for model [2] showed a non-linear (U-shape) relation between 
MI and ψ . A firm that lies on the right side of the U-shape curve (i.e., one with very high 
idiosyncratic volatility) is a firm whose idiosyncratic volatility (ψ) is greater than the 
inflection point (which was at ψ  = 4.930). 3,388 firms (about 10% of the total sample) 
are included in the high-volatility group. Alternatively, in the right half of Table 8, I use 
all sample observations (N=44,639) and sort firm into high-volatility group if its 
volatility is ranked within top 10%. The results reported in Table 8 show that firms with 
high volatility display greater levels of uncertainty and are subject to higher short-sale 
constraints than firms with low idiosyncratic volatility. The mean differences are 
significant in most cases. Since uncertainty is more likely to be associated with noise 
trading and more binding short-sale constraints with more arbitrage risk, this evidence is 
also consistent with the notion that firms with high idiosyncratic volatility will be 
characterized by both more noise trades and higher arbitrage risk, compared to firms with 
normal levels of idiosyncratic volatility.  
 
C. Analysis of Non-linear Relation 
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Table 8 
Firms with Very High Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 
This table reports mean values of firm uncertainty measures and short-selling constraint measures for firms with very high idiosyncratic volatility (ψ) and for the other 
firms. Columns [1] and [2] test 34,471 observations used in the regression [2] of Table 5. The relation is inflected at the point where ψ is at 4.930. Firms with very high 
idiosyncratic volatility are included in column [1] if ψ is greater than 4.930. Columns [3] and [4] test all sample observations. Firms with very high idiosyncratic 
volatility are included in column [3] if ψ is ranked within top 10%. All variables are as defined in Table 1. * and *** indicate significance at the 10%- and 1%-levels, 
respectively. 
 Observations used in the regression [2] of Table 5 
(N = 34,471)  
All sample observations 
(N = 44,639) 
 
 [1] [2]  
Firms with 
very high ψ 
(N=3,388) 
The other 
firms 
(N=31,083) 
Mean diff.: 
[1] – [2] 
t-statistics: 
difference 
=0  
Firms with 
very high ψ 
(N=4,475) 
[3] [4]  
The other 
firms 
(N=40,164) 
Mean diff.: 
[3] – [4] 
t-statistics: 
difference 
=0 
Uncertainty measures          
 Francis et al. (2005) (EQ1)    
    
        
      
0.302 0.339 -0.037***
 
  -3.15  0.317 0.334 -0.017   -1.55 
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) (EQ2) 0.158 0.173 -0.015  -1.27  0.161 0.171 -0.010   -0.91 
 Analyst earnings forecast error (AFE) 1.191 0.727  0.465***   4.03  1.415 0.775  0.640***    6.14 
 Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (AFD) 
 
0.232 0.192  0.040*   1.71  0.317 0.220  0.096*** 
 
   3.72   
 Uncertainty index (UI) 0.519 0.496 0.023***
 
 6.32 0.541
 
0.499 0.042***
 
12.75
Short-selling constraint measures 
 Firm size (SIZE) 18.94   
        
19.69 -0.751*** -27.03  18.93 19.83 -0.898*** -34.85   
  Institutional ownership (INSTP) 0.406 0.516 -0.110*** -21.19 0.400 0.513 -0.114*** -23.69
 Short-selling constraint index (SI) 0.634 0.512  0.122***  27.12  0.649 0.492  0.158***  39.27 
 
Next, I classify firms into different sub-samples after independently sorting on 
both on the uncertainty and short-selling constraint measures and re-test the regressions 
for all sub-samples in order to establish which of the two effects (i.e., noise trades and/or 
arbitrage risk) is reflected in the right side of the U-shaped curve. Table 9 documents the 
coefficients of the first- and second-order terms of idiosyncratic volatility and the 
inflection point obtained from estimating the regression. If any one of the two effects that 
can cause the positive relation between mispricing and firm-specific risk for high 
idiosyncratic volatility stocks dominates, the non-linearity should disappear only in the 
sub-sample where the possibility of that effect is restricted. For instance, I construct a 
group which contains only firms with low uncertainty, i.e., a sub-sample of firms with 
few noise traders. If the U-shaped relationship is not significant for this sub-sample, it is 
possible that the increase of mispricing for high volatility firms is attributed to noise 
traders. Similarly, if the non-linearity becomes insignificant only for firms with low 
short-selling constraints, the positive relation between MI and ψ  for high volatility firms 
could be associated with arbitrage risk. 
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Table 9 
Coefficient of Idiosyncratic Volatility and Inflection Point for Sub-samples 
 
This table shows the coefficient of idiosyncratic volatility and inflection point in the time-series average of cross-sectional regressions of Table V. Sub-samples are 
classified on firm uncertainty and short-selling constraint. All variables are as defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, 
respectively. 
 
  Dep. var. = MI  Dep. var. = ln(1+MI) 
Sub-samples  
[1]  
Linear 
[2]  
Non-
linear 
ψ at infl. 
point 
1-R2 at 
infl. 
point 
% of obs. 
after infl. 
point 
 
[3]  
Linear 
[4]  
Non-
linear 
ψ at infl. 
point 
1-R2 at 
infl.  
point 
% of obs. 
after infl. 
point ψ  -0.006***   
(-2.82) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.004**
(-2.60) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.30) 
[1] 
Less uncertain (low UI) firms 
(= few noise traders) 2ψ
 
 0.002** 4.850
(2.43) 
        99.22% 8.85%  0.001**
(2.36) 
4.861 99.23% 8.82%
ψ  -0.005**   
(-2.23) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.45) 
-0.003*
(-1.87) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.19) 
[2] 
Low short-selling cost (low SI) firms 
(= low arbitrage risk) 2ψ
 
 0.005*** 2.800        
ψ  -0.016**   
(-2.49) 
-0.029* 
(-2.00) 
-0.011**
(-2.38) 
-0.019* 
(2.02) 
[3] 
Low UI & low SI firms 
(= few noise traders & low arbitrage risk) 2ψ
 
 
(3.56) 
94.27% 18.11%  0.003***
(3.39) 
2.752 94.00% 18.79%
0.007         
(1.21) 
N/A† N/A N/A  0.004
(1.27) 
N/A N/A N/A
ψ  -0.005**   
(-2.68) 
-0.018*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.003**
(-2.47) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.89) 
[4] 
Low UI & non-low SI firms 
(= few noise traders & arbitrage risk) 2ψ
 
 0.002** 4.465
(2.16) 
        98.86% 13.44%  0.001**
(2.08) 
4.414 98.80% 13.92%
ψ  -0.005   
(-1.63) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.003
(-1.37) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.75) 
[5] 
Non-low UI & low SI firms 
(= noise traders & low arbitrage risk) 2ψ
 
 0.004** 3.163
(2.46) 
        95.94% 13.36%  0.003**
(2.24) 
3.132 95.82% 13.79%
ψ  -0.005** 
(-2.27) 
-0.016*** 
(-6.46) 
  -0.003**
(-2.08) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.90) 
[6] 
Non-low UI & non-low SI firms 
(= noise traders & arbitrage risk) 2ψ
 
 0.001*** 5.511
(5.68) 
        99.60% 8.38%  0.001***
(5.71) 
5.410 99.55% 8.86%
 
† Not available due to the insignificance of non-linear relation. 
 
Figure 4 
Tests of Three Hypotheses and Evidence 
 
This figure describes the empirical evidence of non-linear relationships among idiosyncratic volatility, equity 
mispricing, and private information-based trading. Based on the findings, tested are three hypotheses; 1) the noise 
trading hypothesis, 2) the informed trading hypothesis, and 3) the arbitrage risk hypothesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private 
information-
based trading 
Idiosyncratic 
volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
volatility 
The informed trading hypothesis is supported. 
The noise trading hypothesis is rejected. 
The arbitrage risk hypothesis is rejected. 
5 – 10% of sample 90 – 95% of sample
The informed trading hypothesis is rejected. 
The noise trading hypothesis is supported. 
The arbitrage risk hypothesis is supported. 
Equity 
Mispricing 
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In Table 9, results show that the non-linear relation remains significant both for 
low uncertainty firms (sub-sample [1]) and for firms with low short-selling constraints 
(sub-sample [2]). The non-linear relationship collapses to a linear one only for the sub-
sample containing firms that have both low uncertainty and low short-selling constraints 
(sub-sample [3]). In this sub-sample, while the negative linear relationship remains strong, 
the non-linear relation becomes insignificant. These results indicate that the increase in 
mispricing for highly volatile stocks cannot be attributed to only one effect. The results 
indicate that both noise trading and arbitrage risk contribute to an increase in MI when ψ  
is very high. Consistent with the previous evidence in Table 5, firm-specific risk (1 – 2R ) 
at the inflection point is very high, ranging from 90% to 99%. The percentage of total 
observations in the range to the right of the inflection point is somewhere between 8% 
and 19%. 
In summary, all test results in this paper provide evidence that idiosyncratic 
volatility in stock returns primarily reflects informational market efficiency. Moreover, 
extremely high volatility implies the possibility of both noise traders’ frenzy and limits of 
informed arbitrage. To clarify the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and equity 
mispricing based on three hypotheses, I sketch the main results in Figure 4. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, I revisit three alternative interpretations of idiosyncratic volatility 
found in past studies and attempt to provide an answer as to if and when each view is 
suited for describing idiosyncratic risk. Past studies have argued that idiosyncratic 
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volatility may reflect informed arbitrageurs’ trading, uninformed noise traders’ frenzy 
without concrete information about a firm, and/or limits to arbitrage opportunities. I test 
three hypotheses of the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and equity mispricing 
corresponding to each of the aforementioned views. The informed trading hypothesis 
proposes that idiosyncratic volatility is a sign of active trading by informed arbitrageurs 
who trace the firm’s fundamental value, and thus predicts that equity mispricing should 
be lower for high idiosyncratic volatility firm. On the contrary, the noise trading 
hypothesis regards idiosyncratic volatility as a sign of uninformed investors’ noise 
trading which causes deviation from the stock’s fundamental value, and thus predicts that 
equity mispricing should be higher for high idiosyncratic volatility firm. The arbitrage 
risk hypothesis predicts that arbitrage activity is impeded when idiosyncratic risk is high 
because arbitrageurs cannot hedge their positions successfully. Systematic mispricing 
may epitomize arbitrageurs’ limit of opportunity to perfectly hedge fundamental risk in 
their portfolios. Therefore, the prediction of the arbitrage risk hypothesis is that the 
equity mispricing of high arbitrage risk stocks should be higher than one of low arbitrage 
risk stocks. 
I test the three hypotheses by employing several mispricing measures as well as 
an aggregated measure, the mispricing index (MI).  I find that the level of mispricing 
declines in volatility, consistent with the informed trading hypothesis. However, I also 
find a strong non-linear, U-shape relation; the level of equity mispricing decreases first 
with idiosyncratic risk but then increases for high levels of idiosyncratic risk. Regressions 
for sub-samples created after sorting on uncertainty and short-selling constraints indicate 
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that high volatility reflects both noise trades and arbitrage risk, thereby inducing a 
positive relation with equity mispricing.  
Recently, the finance literature has emphasized the importance of idiosyncratic 
volatility but provided different ways to interpret it. The contribution of this paper is to 
reconcile the different views of several areas of finance research, and, specifically, to 
produce evidence on the link between idiosyncratic volatility and stock mispricing, which 
allows a clearer understanding of idiosyncratic volatility.  
In summary, the findings in this paper are consistent with the Roll’s (1988) 
former view that idiosyncratic volatility is associated with information-laden stock prices 
and efficient markets. For extremely high volatility, however, we should not ignore the 
possibility of noise traders’ frenzy as well as limits of informed arbitrages. 
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Essay 2 
Agency Costs and the Underlying Causes of Mispricing: Information Asymmetry 
versus Conflict of Interests 
 
I. Introduction 
Both theory and empirical evidence support the notion that equity mispricing has 
an impact on managers’ investment and financing decisions. For example, misvaluation 
can drive firms’ takeover behavior.13 Furthermore, there is evidence that the levels of 
firms’ investment are affected by inefficient market valuations14 and that firms try to time 
equity issues to take advantage of misevaluation.15 
There are several possible reasons why equity mispricing exists. These are related 
to market imperfections such as information asymmetry, transactions costs, 
unsophisticated market participants or unequal access to prices. According to the 
proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis and rational asset pricing, stock 
mispricing, i.e., the deviation from intrinsic (fundamental) value can be either a short-
term temporary phenomenon quickly exploitable by arbitrageurs (Friedman (1953)), or a 
rational compensation for risks that are not accounted for in asset pricing models (see, for 
example, Fama and French (1993 and 1996)). On the other hand, advocates of behavioral 
finance regard persistent mispricing as the result of the existence of an irrational 
(behavioral) component to asset prices. In this study, unlike previous studies that link 
                                                 
13 Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004), and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). 
14 Polk and Sapienza (2003) and Baker, and Stein and Wurgler (2003). 
15 Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Rajan and Servaes (1997), and Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
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market inefficiency to equity mispricing, my focus is on providing evidence on whether 
agency theory can reliably explain equity mispricing. 
Agency theory defines agency costs as the costs associated with divergent 
objectives between agents (management) and owners (shareholders). These conflicts of 
interest cause problems that are exacerbated in the presence of information asymmetry 
where agents discriminately have better/more information than owners. I hypothesize that 
a sizeable component of stock mispricing is due to the lack of transparency at the 
corporate level.16 The term “lack of transparency” in this context refers to the opacity 
caused by information asymmetry and conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders. However, while most prior studies have focused on the linkage between 
information asymmetry and stock misvaluation,17 there is little direct evidence in the 
literature on the potentially important effect of conflict of interests between managers and 
outside shareholders on equity mispricing.  
Suppose, for instance, that there are large differences in the quality and 
availability of information between managers and outside investors of a particular firm. 
Then, one may expect that the firm’s stock is likely to be mispriced because ambiguity 
about future cash flows leads to stock mispricing (see, for example, Kumar (2005) and 
Zhang (2006)). The question that I want to examine is what happens to the size of 
mispricing if the firm attempts to reduce managerial disincentives, e.g., if the board of 
directors provides an incentive-laden compensation package to managers. In this case, 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, mispricing can exist due to 1) high transactions costs (Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003)), 
2) lack of investor sophistication, 3) noise trading (Roll (1988)) etc. 
17 See, among others, Nanda and Narayanan (1999), and Healey and Palepu (2001). 
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even if investors have difficulty obtaining true, reliable information about the firm’s 
future cash flows, they may credibly rely on inference from observing managers’ 
decisions, and thereby the ambiguity that causes misvaluation could be mitigated. Thus, 
if my conjecture is correct, the level of mispricing should be related to components of 
managerial compensation packages which are intended to resolve the conflict of interests 
(or, incentive conflicts).  
Using ten agency conflict proxy variables, I identify the firms which are most 
likely to have agency problems. However, it is unclear whether these variables measure 
the level of information asymmetry or incentive conflicts. In fact, they could represent 
one or the other, or even both. This is because information asymmetry and incentive 
conflicts are highly correlated. In order to identify which component of agency conflict 
(i.e., information asymmetry or conflict of interests) drives mispricing, I employ 
managerial compensation data and investigate whether and how mispricing is affected by 
equity-based compensation, which is known as the tool that can align managerial 
interests with those of shareholders but not necessarily as a tool suited for resolving 
information asymmetry. Previous studies suggesting stock-based compensation is an 
efficient agency problem resolution mechanism typically do not differentiate among 
different stock-based incentives and relate them to both lowered agency costs and 
enhanced firm stock value.18  In light of the recent public skepticism about the 
effectiveness of equity-based compensation fueled from financial scandals (i.e., Enron 
                                                 
18 For a detailed discussion about equity-based compensation, see Bhagat, Brickley, and Lease (1985), 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a and 1990b), DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990), Mehran (1995), Core and 
Guay (2001), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Frye (2004), Core and 
Larcker (2002), and Nam, Tang, Thornton, and Wynne (2006). 
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and WorldCom) and academic evidence (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon (2006)), in my 
analysis I consider separately both major equity-based compensation components, i.e. 
stock options and restricted stock grants. While options have been shown to induce 
managerial myopia (i.e., shorter-term orientation), restricted stock grants have been 
shown to induce managers to become less myopic (i.e., longer-term orientated).19  
My results show a significant positive relation between agency problems and 
equity mispricing. Furthermore, using CEO compensation data, I find that, contrary to 
previous studies’ argument that information asymmetry is a key determinant in equity 
mispricing, information asymmetry is not a powerful explanatory variable of mispricing. 
When I interact agency costs proxies with variables that capture managerial 
compensation components intended to resolve the interests’ conflict between CEO and 
owners, the models explain a significant proportion of mispricing. My findings obtained 
from several univariate and multivariate tests support the notion that the positive relation 
of agency costs with mispricing is mainly driven by stock options’ awards to the CEO. 
The empirical evidence also suggests that the use of restricted stock grants that are known 
to not be associated with managerial myopia is a better choice in terms of reducing 
interest conflicts.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, I develop the 
main hypotheses to prove the relation between incentive conflicts and mispricing. Section 
III describes the data sources and measures of main variables.  Section IV introduces 
empirical methodology and reports test results.  Section V conducts additional tests 
                                                 
19 See Aboody and Kaznik (2000), Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Gao and Shrieves (2002), and 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).  
 51
 52
                                                
utilizing managerial compensation data and provides a more detailed explanation of the 
relation between agency costs and mispricing. Section VI includes a summary and 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. Hypotheses Development 
I assume that a sizeable component of stock mispricing is due to the lack of 
transparency (i.e., opacity) at the corporate level, which stems from two sources. First, 
outside investors’ ambiguity about firms’ future cash flows increases when they have 
limited access to information or when investors’ information is of poor quality relative to 
that of firm insiders. Therefore, the more opaque the information available to investors 
about a firm’s true but unobservable distribution of future cash flows, the greater the 
degree of deviation of market value from intrinsic value.20 Second, the lack of 
transparency can be also caused by the severity of the conflict of interests that may exist 
between managers and investors. If this is true, the mispriced firms should have greater 
agency costs than other firms. This relation is graphically depicted in Figure 5 
Hypothesis # 1: Firms with high agency costs are more likely to display high levels of 
equity mispricing. 
 
20 Since Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that firms subject to higher information asymmetry are more 
likely to refuse valuable investment opportunities and to suffer from unfavorable misvaluation, many 
authors have documented the impact of asymmetry information on misevaluation. Nanda and Narayanan 
(1999) formally develop an information related argument in the context of divestitures through a model of 
asymmetric information about firm value between the managers and the market. They assume that the 
market can observe the aggregate cash flows of the firm but not the individual divisional cash flows, which 
results in misvaluation of the firm’s securities. Healey and Palepu (2001) argue that misvaluation arises 
when there is information asymmetry between managers and investors that is not fully resolved. 
Firm with high 
agency costs 
Firm with low 
agency costs 
Undervaluation 
Overvaluation 
Second best optimal 
stock price with low 
agency costs 
Second best optimal 
stock price with high 
agency costs 
First best optimal 
stock price without 
any agency costs 
Mispricing of firm with 
low agency costs 
Mispricing of firm with 
high agency costs 
Figure 5 
Agency Costs, Fundamental Value, and Equity Mispricing 
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This figure graphically describes the relation between agency costs and equity mispricing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency costs, by definition, are the costs incurred by a firm that are associated 
with problems such as divergent objectives between management and shareholders and/or 
information asymmetry where insiders discriminately have access to better/more 
information than outside shareholders. If mispricing is due to the information asymmetry, 
equity-based compensation should not be significantly related to the level of mispricing. 
In contrast, if mispricing is due to the degree of the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders, it should be related to components of managerial incentive 
compensation.  
Hypothesis # 2: The positive impact of agency costs on equity mispricing is mainly 
attributed to the conflict of interests rather than to information asymmetry. 
The finance literature has adopted two different views on the linkage between 
agency problems and executive compensation. First, many authors21 regard managerial 
compensation as a potential agency conflict resolution mechanism. Under this view, 
corporate boards design compensation packages to provide managers with the correct 
incentives to maximize shareholder value. Several studies found that firm’s stock 
performance is positively related to the fraction of equity-based compensation suggesting 
that equity-based compensation resolves agency problems.22 
                                                 
21 They are Bhagat et al. (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990a and 1990b), DeFusco et al. (1990), Mehran 
(1995), Core and Guay (2001), Datta et al. (2001), and Core and Larcker (2002). 
22 For example, Bhagat et al. (1985) find that the adoption of employee stock purchase plans result in an 
increase in shareholder wealth, and that equity-based compensation schemes motivate top managers more 
than lower-level employees. Jensen and Murphy (1990a and 1990b) suggest that equity-based, rather than 
cash-based, compensation is more efficient in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. DeFusco 
et al. (1990) find that implicit share price variance and stock return variance increase after the firm 
approves an executive stock option plan. Moreover, their event study analysis results indicate that the 
announcement of approval of stock option plans leads to an increase in stock price along with a significant 
negative reaction in the bond market, suggesting that executive stock options may transfer wealth from 
bondholders to stockholders. Mehran (1995) shows that firm performance is positively related to the 
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The alternative view of executive compensation found in the literature is that of 
executive compensation being part of the agency problem itself. Recent corporate 
scandals involving excessive managerial pay coupled with abysmal performance and 
wealth expropriation of outside shareholders, such as those at Enron and WorldCom, 
have cast doubts over prior beliefs about the effectiveness of equity-based compensation. 
Moreover, researchers suggesting stock-based compensation as an efficient mechanism 
used to solve agency problems typically treated all stock-based incentives equally and 
related them to lowered agency costs as well as enhanced firm stock value. The 
skepticism about the effectiveness of equity-based compensation motivated my decision 
to analyze equity-based compensation by separately considering its stock options- and 
restricted stock grants components.  
It is intuitively appealing to think that incentive stock options should have a 
positive impact on firm performance. But options may also impose a penalty on the firm 
because they tend to make managers more myopic. In particular, because managers’ 
gains from stock option grants are exponentially greater than stock appreciation returns, 
                                                                                                                                                 
managers’ ownership and the amount of shares provided by their compensation packages. He also shows 
that firms with higher percentage of shares held by outside blockholders use less equity-based 
compensation. Based on theses findings, he suggests that the monitoring by outside blockholders can be a 
substitute for incentive equity compensation for executives. Core and Guay (2001) show that firms use 
options to attract and retain certain types of employees as well as to create incentives to increase firm value. 
Datta et al. (2001) document a positive relation between equity-based compensation received by acquiring 
managers’ equity-based compensation and acquirer firms’ stock price response around and following 
corporate acquisition announcements. They also find that acquiring firms with high equity-based 
compensation do not show underperformance documented by Loughran and Vijh (1997) and others. Frye 
(2004) provides evidence that firms with high percentage of equity-based compensation show better 
performance measured by Tobin’s q. Core and Larcker (2002) show that mandatory increases in the level 
of managerial equity ownership result in improvements in accounting returns and stock returns. Nam et al. 
(2006) examine the effectiveness of equity-based compensation in mitigating the agency costs in single- 
and multi-segment firms, and find that the effect for multi-segment firms, where agency costs are expected 
to be higher, is much greater than for single-segment firms. 
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managers have an incentive to maximize short-term stock price appreciation to increase 
their options’ exercise value. It is conceivable then that an increase in stock value could 
lead to a substantial enough increase in the value of the stock option grants to provide the 
managers with an incentive to cash out and leave the company. Such a scenario would be 
especially true if projects and investments chosen by the managers have a short-term 
focus at the expense of long-term wealth creation.  
The finance and accounting literatures broadly document that executives have the 
ability to manage the timing of stock option grants and/or the information flow around 
option grants. 23 In a recently published study Lie (2005) proposes an alternative way in 
explaining the abnormal return pattern around options grants (i.e., return which is 
abnormally negative before executive option grants and abnormally positive afterward). 
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Yermak (1997)) that argue conventional grant timing, Lie 
(2005) argues that, to enrich their senior executives, firms may simply backdate the stock 
option grant date to a time period where the market price was particularly low.24, 25 
                                                 
23 Yermack (1997) investigates corporate managers’ influence over the terms of their own compensation by 
analyzing the timing of CEO stock option awards. He finds that CEO option awards are followed by 
significantly positive abnormal returns. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) suggest that CEOs make opportunistic 
voluntary disclosure decisions to maximize their stock option compensation. Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) 
show that stock price significantly decreases in the 10 days prior to stock option grants. Carpenter and 
Remmers (2001) find that abnormal stock returns after exercises by top managers at small firms are 
significantly negative. Huddart and Lang (2003) examine the stock option exercise decisions of over 
50,000 employees at seven corporations and present evidence that stock exercise is high before the stock 
price decreases and low before stock price increases. They suggest that the timing when both senior and 
junior employees exercise their stock options can be used to predict future stock returns. 
24 Heron and Lie (2007) look at a 2002 change in regulatory law that requires companies to report option 
grants within 48 hours. They document that the return pattern (i.e., returns which are abnormally negative 
before executive option grants and abnormally positive afterward) weakens after the SEC requirement. 
They find that when companies reported options the same day they were granted, there was no pattern of 
share prices quickly rising. But the pattern continued when companies delayed reporting option grants. 
These findings support the Lie’s backdating theory. 
25 The theory has been also supported by the recent anecdotal evidence from the SEC’s investigation of 
many cases (e.g., Mercury Interactive). “SEC investigators previously had posited that companies were 
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Another negative aspect of option grants is that options appear to lead executives to take 
risks that might not be in the best interest of shareholders. This can occur because stock 
option grants offer substantial upside potential, but impose little downside risk on 
managers (see Sanders (2001)). They serve as motivational “carrots” but lack the 
complementary disciplinary “stick.” Thus, executives may view the potential option 
payouts as a form of compensation lottery.26 Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that 
managers of firms with earnings based compensation incentives maximized their awards 
by choosing income increasing accounting methodologies.27  
Based on the above evidence I expect that options grants effectively make CEOs 
more myopic. In other words, as the proportion of options in a CEO’s compensation 
package increases, so does the incentive to make short-term wealth maximization 
decisions that might not be in the best interest of long-term stakeholders.  
Restricted stock grants endow managers with a number of shares of firm’s equity, 
but also restrict managers from reselling or transferring shares and contain provisions that 
invalidate the award if managers quit or are fired before the restricted period. While 
options have been shown to induce managerial myopia, restricted stock grants have been 
shown to reduce managerial myopia.28 Another important difference between restricted 
                                                                                                                                                 
timing grants to benefit from positive corporate news that would drive up stock prices, such as strong 
earnings. But increasingly they are focusing on backdating” (11/11/2005, Wall Street Journal). 
26 Warren Buffett shares this opinion as he conceded that “we don’t give options because it would be a 
lottery ticket”. 
27 Gao and Shrieves (2002) find that option grants and exercisable in-the-money options are positively 
correlated with earnings management intensity. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide evidence that 
during years of high discretionary accruals CEOs exercise unusually large numbers of options and sell large 
quantities of shares. 
28 For example, Narayanan (1996) theoretically investigated the relationship between two types of 
compensation, cash and non-cash, and the manager’s decision horizon. He did not investigate the effect of 
options as a form of non-cash compensation but rather focused on restricted stock grants. He found that all-
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stock and options is that restricted stock grants have more of a linear payoff relative to 
stock option grants.29 It is also reasonable to argue that restricted stock grants provide 
less incentive for earnings management because the reversion of earnings management 
accruals will likely manifest before managers can realize large personal gains (see Gao 
and Shrieves (2002)). Therefore, it is expected that restricted stock grants are effective in 
resolving agency problems and thereby improving firm performance.  
Because, as discussed above, options have been shown to induce managerial 
myopia, while restricted stock grants have been shown to induce managers to become 
less myopic, I focus on the two incentive compensation plans separately. On one hand, 
mispricing can be reduced when incentive conflicts are resolved by a compensation 
package, which contains a high proportion of restricted stocks. On the other hand, 
mispricing can be exaggerated when firms provide CEOs with compensation packages 
which have many stock options. 
                                                                                                                                                 
cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long term while restricted stock grants induce 
managers to overinvest in the long term. He concluded that a combination of both cash and restricted stock 
produces efficient investment. Kole (1997) finds that stock options and restricted stocks are common in 
R&D intensive industries, but the difference in corporate use of restricted stocks between high- and low-
R&D intensive industries is economically and statistically more significant than the difference of corporate 
use of stock options. However, Ryan and Wiggins (2002) report that R&D investment is positively related 
to stock options but negatively related to restricted stocks. This finding is, they interpret, because the linear 
payoff of restricted stock encourages managers to avoid risky investment and the nonlinear payoff of 
options motivates risk-taking behavior. 
29 Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000), and Ryan and Wiggins (2002) contend that restricted stock grants, due 
to their linear payoffs, are relatively inefficient in inducing risk-averse CEOs to accept risky, value-
increasing investment projects. On the other hand, it is plausible that the linear payoff of restricted stock 
grants does not adversely affect CEO decisions because it precludes the potential of earning a windfall in 
the short-term and discourages CEOs from making decisions that could be harmful to stakeholders’ long-
term interests. 
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Hypothesis # 3a: All other things equal, equity mispricing caused by agency conflicts 
between managers and outside investors should be mitigated by the use 
of restricted stock grants in CEO compensation packages. 
Hypothesis # 3b: All other things equal, equity mispricing caused by agency conflicts 
between managers and outside investors should be exaggerated by the 
use of stock option grants in CEO compensation packages. 
 
III. Data and Measures 
I extract return data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
where NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks are listed. The initial sample includes all firms 
in CRSP from 1985 to 2004, omitting financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-
4999) firms. Accounting and financial data are drawn from COMPUSTAT. Firms with 
market value of equity less than $20 million are excluded in order to avoid cases of firms 
with distorted valuation multiples in the mispricing measures. I collect CEO 
compensation data from the sample of firms in Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp 
database. The S&P’s ExecuComp database covers the period from year 1992 to 2003, and 
includes executive compensation data for firms in the S&P 1500 index, which comprises 
the S&P 500, the S&P 400 mid cap, and the S&P 600 small cap indices. ExecuComp also 
contains information on firms that are not currently in the S&P500, the S&P400, and the 
S&P 600 indices, but were previously included in one of the aforementioned indices. 
According to ExecuComp, CEOs’ total compensation is comprised of seven items: 1) 
salary, 2) bonus, 3) stock options granted, 4) restricted stock grants, 5) long-term 
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incentive plan, 6) other annual compensation, and 7) all other compensation. Details of 
all compensation variables are provided in Table 10 and summary statistics are 
documented in Table 11. 
The final sample includes 38,781 firm-year observations with 6,446 firms during 
the sample period. For the tests that utilize CEO compensation data the sample is reduced 
to 8.657 firm-year observations. 
 
A. Measures of Equity Mispricing 
Firm mispricing is measured as the deviation of a firm’s equity value from its 
intrinsic or fundamental value. I develop six alternative mispricing measures. The first 
four measures employ alternative techniques in estimating intrinsic value benchmarks, 
the fifth measure is based on a standard asset pricing model, and the last one is an index 
that combines all measures. The mispricing measures are as follows. 
1) |EXVRIi,t|, the absolute value of the natural logarithm of the ratio between the stock 
price and its intrinsic value from Ohlson’s (1995) residual income value approach. 
EXVI is computed at the end of June of each year. 
EXVRIi,t ,
,
ln
( )
i t
i t
PRICE
I V
⎡ ⎤= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎥
, (1) 
where PRICEi,t is the stock price at the end of June of each year from CRSP, and 
I(V)i,t is intrinsic value using the residual income model (Ohlson (1995)) and median 
values of analysts’ forecasts issued in June, as in Frankel and Lee (1998). There is 
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strong empirical evidence in support of the residual income valuation, V/P, as an 
indicator of mispricing.30   
2) |EXVBOi,t|, the absolute value of excess value computed at the end of June of each 
year as the natural logarithm of the ratio between a firm’s capital and its imputed 
value, based on Berger and Ofek (1995) approach. 
EXVBOi,t ,
,
ln
( )
i t
i t
CPTL
I CPTL
⎡ ⎤= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎥
                                                
, (2) 
where CPTLi,t is total capital, which is market value of equity plus book value of 
debt, I(CPTLi,t) is the imputed value derived as the product of firm sales and the 
median capital to sales ratio in the firm’s industry. The industry classification here is 
based on the Fama-French 48 sectors. This measure of mispricing is constructed in a 
similar fashion as the first one (EXVRIi,t), but uses firm’s total capital instead of price 
and computes imputed value based on Fama-French 48 industry classification.  
3) |EXVRKi,t|, the absolute value of the firm-specific component of the difference 
between market value and fundamental value, based on Model III of Rhodes-Kropf et 
al. (2005). This procedure differs from the residual income valuation approach in the 
sense that it does not rely on analysts’ earnings forecasts. According to Rhodes-Kropf 
et al. (2005), fundamental value, V is estimated by decomposing the market-to-book 
into two components: a measure of price to fundamentals (ln(M/V)), and a measure of 
 
30 Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) report that V/P predicts one-month-ahead returns on the Dow 30 
stocks better than aggregate book-to-market. Frankel and Lee (1998) also show that the residual income 
value is a better predictor than book value of the cross-section of contemporaneous stock prices, and that 
V/P is a predictor of the one-year-ahead cross-section of returns. In addition, Ali et al. (2003) show that 
after controlling for several possible risk factors, V/P continues to significantly predict future returns. 
D’Mello and Shroff (2000) apply V/P to measure mispricing of equity repurchases, and Dong et al. (2006) 
to takeovers. 
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fundamentals to book value (ln(V/B)). The first component captures the part of book-
to-market associated with mispricing. In extreme cases where markets perfectly 
anticipate, this component would be equal to zero, otherwise positive (over-valuation) 
or negative (under-valuation). This component is further decomposed into firm-
specific and industry-specific misprising. In my tests, I use the firm-specific 
mispricing component based on Model III of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) that also 
accounts for net income and leverage effects. 
ln(Mi,t) = α0j,t + α1j,t ln(Bi,t) + α2j,t ln(NI)+i,t + α3j,t I(<0)ln(NI)+i,t  
+ α4j,t ln(LEVi,t) + ζi,t  (3) 
where M is firm value, B is book value, NI+ is absolute value of net income, 
I(<0)ln(NI)+ is an indicator function for negative net income observations, and LEV is 
the leverage ratio.  
4) |MBIAi,t|, the absolute value of the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio.  
MBIAi,t ,
,
ln
( )
i t
j t
MB
Med MB
⎡ ⎤= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥ , (4) 
where, MBi,t is the market to book ratio for firm i at time t, and Med(MBj,t) is the jth  
industry median of MBt. Several empirical studies have utilized MB as a mispricing 
measure (see, among others, Walkling and Edmister (1985), Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)).  
5) |ARET|, the absolute value of a firm’s average monthly abnormal return for each year. 
The expected return of month t is computed using the factor coefficients obtained 
from the Fama/French three-factor model estimated over the five-year period 
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immediately preceding month t. For example, the 60-month period from January 
1987 to December 1991 is used to estimate the parameters used to compute the 
expected return for January 1992. The estimation of the parameters is based on the 
following model:  
E(Ri,t) – Rf,t = β0  + βM (Rm,t  – Rf,t) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + ψit  (5) 
where E(Rit) is the rate of return on the ith company’s common stock in month t, Rf,t is 
risk-free rate, Rm,t is the value-weighted market portfolio return, and SMBt and HMLt 
are the size and book-to-market factors as in Fama and French (1993, 1996). 
Abnormal returns, ARETi,t, are computed as differences of actual returns, Ri,t, from 
the expected returns derived from the parameters of model (5). The mispricing from 
standard asset pricing model is: 
|ARETi,t|= |Ri,t  – E(Ri,t)|  (6) 
6) MIi,t, a mispricing index that combines all five mispricing measures described 
above.31 The mispricing index is constructed each year for each observation i = 
1,…,N as: 
,
1 1 (| |)
K
i k
k
MI RANK EXV
N K
= ∑ i k
                                                
, (7) 
where Rankk(|EXVi,k|) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation 
from least misvalued (rank of one) to most misvalued (rank of N). |EXVi,k| is the kth 
measure of mispricing for firm i in the sample, and K represents the dimensions of 
mispricing measures. The denominator, K, averages the ranks by the number of 
 
31 In constructing MI, I employ the methodology outlined in Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005). In their 
paper, they create a liquidity index that comprises the effects of ranking on 6 different liquidity measures. 
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mispricing values available for each firm in the sample in a particular year. For 
example, the sum of the Rankk(|EXVi,k|) values of a firm that has only 3 mispricing 
measures is divided by K=3. Finally, dividing by N, I scale the MI from 0 (least 
mispriced) to 1 (most mispriced). By computing average of all ranks from five 
different mispricing measures, MI has the advantage that it balances out the effects 
and shortcomings of all other mispricing measures while aggregating their 
informativeness, and thereby provides a more complete picture of mispricing.  
Detailed descriptions for all variables used to construct MI and their summary 
statistics can be found in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. Panel A of Table 12 shows the 
coefficients of correlations between the different mispricing measures. As expected, all 
mispricing measures are significantly positively correlated at the one percent level, or 
better, even though these valuation measures are based on widely different theoretical 
concepts and their measurements rely on a variety of accounting and/or financial 
variables. All individual mispricing measures are more significantly and positively 
correlated with the mispricing index (MI) than with the other individual measures, 
suggesting that MI is an appropriate aggregate measure of mispricing for use in the tests.  
Table 10 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables  Descriptions
Mispricing measures 
 |EXVRI| Absolute value of excess value based on Ohlson’s (1995) residual income value approach. EXVRIit [ ]ln ( )it itPRICE I V= ,where PRICEit is the 
stock price at the end of June of each year from CRSP, and I(V)it is intrinsic value using the residual income model (Ohlson (1995)) and median 
values of analysts’ forecasts issued in June, as in Frankel and Lee (1998). 
 [ / (i t i tCPTL I CPTL=|EXVBO| Absolute value of excess value based on Berger and Ofek (1995) approach. EXVBOi,t ,) ] , where CPTLi,t is total capital, 
which is market value of equity plus book value of debt, I(CPTLi,t) is the imputed value derived as the product of firm sales and the median capital 
to size ratio in the firm’s industry. The industry classification here is based on the Fama-French 48 sectors. This measure of mispricing is 
constructed in a similar fashion as the first one (EXVRIi,t), but uses firm’s total capital instead of price and computes imputed value based on 
Fama-French 48 industry classification. Thus the intrinsic value here is a size and industry benchmark. 
,
 |EXVRK| Absolute value of the excess value based on Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Fundamental value, V is estimated by decomposing the market-to-book 
into two components: a measure of price to fundamentals (ln(M/V)), and a measure of fundamentals to book value (ln(V/B)). The first component 
captures the part of book-to-market associated with mispricing. This component is further decomposed into firm-specific and industry-specific 
misprising. I use the firm-specific mispricing component based on Model III of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) that also accounts for net income and 
leverage effects. ln(Mi,t)= α0j,t + α1j,t ln(Bi,t)+ α2j,t ln(NI)+i,t + α3j,t I(<0)ln(NI)+i,t + α4j,t ln(LEVi,t)+ ζi,t, where M is firm value, B is book value, NI+ is 
absolute value of net income, I(<0)ln(NI)+ is an indicator function for negative net income observations, and LEV is the leverage ratio.  
 |EXVMB| Absolute value of the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio. MBIAi,t , ,ln[ ( ) ]MB Med MBi t j t= , where, MBi,t is the market to book ratio for firm i 
at time t, and Med(MBj,t) is the jth  industry median of MBt.  
 |ARET| Absolute value of a firm’s average monthly abnormal return for each year. The expected return of month t is computed using benchmarks from the 
Fama/French three-factor model estimated over the five-year period immediately preceding month t. The estimation of the parameters is based on 
the model, E(Ri,t) – Rf,t = β0  + βM (Rm,t  – Rf,t) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + ψit , where E(Rit) is the rate of return on the ith company’s common 
stock in month t, Rf,t is risk-free rate, Rm,t is the value-weighted market portfolio return, and SMBt and HMLt are the size and book-to-market 
factors as in Fama and French (1993, 1996). Abnormal returns, ARETi,t, are computed as differences of actual returns, Ri,t, from the expected 
returns derived from the parameters of model, and |ARETi,t|= |Ri,t  – E(Ri,t)| 
 MI Mispricing index. k i k , where Rankk(|EXVi,k|) is the rank function which assigns a rank for each observation 
from least misvalued (rank of one) to most misvalued (rank of N). |EXVi,k| is the kth measure of mispricing for firm i in my sample, and K 
represents the dimensions of mispricing measures. The denominator, K, averages the ranks by the number of mispricing values available for each 
firm in the sample in a particular year. N is number of observations. MI is scaled from 0 (least mispriced) to 1 (most mispriced).  
,(1/ )(1/ ) (| |)
K
i k
MI N K RANK EXV= ∑
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Variables  Descriptions
Agency cost measures 
 FCF Free cash flows computed as the interaction of the growth with free cash flows. ( ), , , ,    i t i t i t i tFCF Free cash flows Total assets Gowth dummy= × , 
where Free cash flow = operating income before depreciation – (taxes + interest expense + dividends paid). Growth dummy = 1 if the firm’s 
Tobin’s q is less than 1 and 0 otherwise. Tobin’s q = [market value of common equity + preferred stock liquidating value + long-term debt – 
(short-term assets – short-term liabilities)] / (total assets). 
 EXPR Expense ratio which measures the inefficiency in the management control of operating costs. , , ,i t i t i tEXPR Operating expense Sales= .  
 AUR Asset utilization ratio which measures the effectiveness of firm’s management in deploying assets. , , ,i t i t i tAUR Sales Total assets=  
 INDB Proportion of independent directors on corporate board.  
 IO Institutional ownership which is the percentage of shares that are owned by institutional investors. 
 GI Corporate governance index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) to proxy for the level of shareholder rights. The Governance Index is 
constructed by counting 28 provisions listed in 5 categories: Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State. Among 28 provisions, 24 are unique and 
equally weight in index. A firm with high governance index (i.e., many anti-takeover provisions) is expected to have high level of agency problem. 
 CMPT Product market competition which is computed as the inverse value of Herfindahl concentration index. CMPTi = 
( ) 221 j j ⎥⎟ , where Salesj is the annual sales of jth firm belonging to the industry in which firm i is included. A higher 
CMPT (i.e., lower Herfindahl index) thus indicates that a product market is more competitive. 
j j
Sales Sales
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢= − ⎜⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
 ACOV Analyst coverage is computed as residual from the regression of analyst coverage on firm size. Forecast variable is extracted from security analyst’ 
one fiscal year-ahead forecasts collected every June from I/B/E/S Detail History Database. 
 AFE Analyst earnings forecast error. , , , , || ( ) | | ( )i t i t i t+1 i tAFE Med AF EPS Med AF⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ , where Med(AF)i,t is the median forecast and the actual earnings 
per share EPSi,t+1 is the actual earnings per share. Variables are extracted from security analyst’ one fiscal year-ahead forecasts collected every 
June from I/B/E/S Detail History Database. 
 AFD Analyst earnings forecast dispersion. , , , |. .( ) | ( )i t i t i tStd Dev AF Med AFAFD = , where Std.Dev.(AF)i,t is standard deviation of one year ahead 
forecasts. Variables are extracted from security analyst’ one fiscal year-ahead forecasts collected every June from I/B/E/S Detail History Database. 
 ACI Agency cost index. ACI is constructed by using the same methodology for mispricing index (MI) and by combining all ranks of five variables 
(FCF, EXPR, GI, AFE, and AFD) and inverse ranks of five variables (AUR, INDB, IO, CMPT, and ACOV). ACI is scaled from 0 (least agency 
costs) to 1 (greatest agency costs). 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Variables Descriptions
Compensation variables 
 TCOMP Total compensation (in thousand $) which comprises 7 items: 1) salary, 2) bonus, 3) exercised options, 4) restricted stock grant, 5) long-term 
incentive plan, 6) other annual compensation, and 7) all other compensation. 
 SALARY Salary which is the dollar value (in thousand $) of the base salary (cash and non-cash). 
 BONUS Bonus which is the dollar value (in thousand $) of a bonus (cash and non-cash).  
 RSTOCK Restricted stock grant which is the value (in thousand $) of restricted stock granted which is determined as of the date of the grant.  
 OPTION Stock option grant is the aggregated dollar value (in thousand $) of stock options granted to the CEO during the year as valued using S&P’s 
Black-Scholes methodology. 
 LTIP Long-term incentive plan is the dollar value (in thousand $) paid out to the CEO under the company's long-term incentive plan. forgiveness, 3) 
imputed Interest, 4) payouts for cancellation of stock options, 5) payment for unused vacation, 6) tax reimbursements, 7) signing bonuses, 8) 401K 
contributions, and 9) life insurance premiums. 
 OTHERC Other annual compensation which is the dollar value (in thousand $) of other annual compensation not properly categorized as salary or bonus. 
This includes items such as: 1) perquisites and other personal benefits, 2) above market earnings on restricted stock, options/SARs or deferred 
compensation paid during the year but deferred by the officer, 3) earnings on long-term incentive plan compensation paid during the year but 
deferred at the election of the officer, 4) tax reimbursements, and 5) the dollar value of difference between the price paid by the officer for 
company stock and the actual market price of the stock under a stock purchase plan that is not generally available to shareholders or employees of 
the company (Note: This does not include value realized from exercising stock options).  
 ALLOC All other compensation which is the dollar value (in thousand $) listed under "All Other Compensation" in the Summary Compensation Table. 
This is compensation that does not belong to other categories, which includes items such as: 1) severance payments, 2) debt forgiveness, 3) 
imputed Interest, 4) payouts for cancellation of stock options, 5) payment for unused vacation, 6) tax reimbursements, 7) signing bonuses, 8) 401K 
contributions, and 9) life insurance premiums. 
 %RSTOCK Restricted stock grant / total compensation. 
 %OPTION Stock option grant / total compensation. 
Firm characteristic 
 SIZE Log of total assets. 
 LEV Leverage. The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
 ROA Return on assets. The ratio of net income to total assets. 
 AGE Firm age. AGE = ln(1+ age), where age is the number of years since the stock inclusion in the CRSP database. 
 DIVER Diversification dummy that equals one if a firm operates in multi-segments and zero otherwise. 
 DD Dividend-payer dummy that equals one if a firm pays dividends and zero otherwise. 
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Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Reported are descriptive statistics for my sample firms. The sample contains 38,781 firm-year observations (6,446 
firms) over the period 1985 – 2004. All variables are as defined in Table 10. 
 
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. 5% Median 95% 
Mispricing measures       
 Ohlson (1995) approach (|EXVRI|) 36,115 0.794 0.841 0.077 0.677 1.889 
 Berger and Ofek (1995) approach (|EXVBO|) 38,582 0.641 0.608 0.036  0.489 1.739 
 Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) approach (|EXVRK|) 38,779 0.385 0.355 0.025  0.288 1.081 
 Market-to-book ratio approach (|EXVMB|) 38,781 0.404 0.379 0.018 0.302 1.155 
 Abnormal return approach (|ARET|) 38,775 0.102 0.056 0.039 0.089 0.207 
 Mispricing index (MI) 38,781 0.502 0.172 0.240 0.489 0.805 
Agency cost measures       
 Free cash flow (FCF) 27,129 0.013 0.035 0 0 0.084 
 Expense ratio (EXPR) 27,815 0.375 4.196 0.047 0.228 0.692 
 Asset utilization ratio (AUR) 38,781 1.208 0.807 0.243 1.071 2.648 
 Independent board of directors (INDB) 9,373 0.626 0.193 0.273 0.667 0.889 
 Institutional ownership (IO) 30,483 0.503 0.243 0.093 0.513 0.892 
 Governance index (GI) 15,613 9.073 2.748 5 9 14 
 Product market competition (CMPT) 38,781 0.876 0.105 0.669 0.914 0.971 
 Analyst coverage (ACOV) 36,827 -2×10-9 5.517 -7.623 -0.574 10.39 
 Analyst earnings forecast error (AFE) 34,022 0.823 6.306 0.005 0.130 2.587 
 Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (AFD) 33,097 0.220 1.272 0.009 0.048 0.706 
 Agency cost index (ACI) 38,781 0.505 0.130 0.295 0.503 0.724 
Compensation variables       
 Total compensation (TCOMP) 10,812 3,768 13,820 322.9 1,366 12,919 
 Salary (SALARY) 10,812 592.0 338.7 206.1 530.0 1102 
 Bonus (BONUS) 10,812 580.5 1061 0 311.8 2000 
 Restricted stock grant (RSTOCK) 10,812 425.0 9053 0 0 1307 
 Stock options (OPTION) 10,812 1851 9684 0 0 8460 
 Long-term incentive plan (LTIP) 10,812 139.4 793.4 0 0 714.0 
 Other annual compensation (OTHERC) 10,812 43.20 225.9 0 0 182.1 
 All other compensation (ALLOC) 10,812 136.8 794.4 0 16.64 400.3 
 % of restricted stock grant (%RSTOCK ) 10,812 0.052 0.142 0 0 0.393 
 % of stock options (%OPTION ) 10,812 0.182 0.296 0 0 0.858 
Firm characteristics       
 Firm size (SIZE) 38,781 19.76 1.677 17.36 19.56 22.86 
 Leverage (LEV) 38,647 0.163 0.179 0 0.103 0.536 
 Return on assets (ROA) 38,781 0.031 0.121 -0.182 0.049 0.161 
 Firm age (AGE) 38,781 2.334 0.843 1.099 2.398 3.555 
 Diversification dummy (DIVER) 31,798 0.328 0.469 0 0 1 
 Dividend-payer dummy (DD) 37,350 0.381 0.486 0 0 1 
 
Table 12 
Correlations Coefficients between Index and Individual Measures 
 
This table shows the correlations coefficients between index and individual measures and corresponding p-values in brackets. All variables are as defined in Table 10. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Correlations between mispricing index (MI) and individual measures 
 Constructed sign of 
correlation with MI MI |EXVRI|   |EXVBO| |EXVRK| |EXVMB| 
Ohlson (1995) approach 
(|EXVRI|) + 
0.323*** 
[0.000] 
    
       
Berger and Ofek (1995) 
approach (|EXVBO|) + 
0.514*** 
[0.000] 
0.084*** 
[0.000] 
   
       
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) 
approach (|EXVRK|) + 
0.688*** 
[0.000] 
0.175*** 
[0.000] 
0.252*** 
[0.000] 
  
       
Market-to-book ratio 
approach (|EXVMB|) + 
0.705*** 
[0.000] 
0.142*** 
[0.000] 
0.300*** 
[0.000] 
0.749*** 
[0.000] 
 
       
Abnormal return approach 
(|ARET|) + 
0.435*** 
[0.000] 
0.117*** 
[0.000] 
0.206*** 
[0.000] 
0.200*** 
[0.000] 
0.191*** 
[0.000] 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
 
Constructed
sign of 
correlation 
with ACI ACI FCF EXPR AUR INDB IO GI CMPT ACOV AFE
Free cash flow (FCF) + 0.160*** [0.000] 
         
            
Expense ratio (EXPR) + 0.049*** [0.000] 
-0.012* 
[0.051] 
        
            
Asset utilization ratio 
(AUR) - 
-0.438*** 
[0.000] 
0.139*** 
[0.000] 
-0.044*** 
[0.000] 
       
            
Independent board of 
directors (INDB) - 
-0.163*** 
[0.000] 
0.008 
[0.453] 
-0.026** 
[0.020] 
-0.017 
[0.109] 
      
            
Institutional ownership 
(IO) - 
-0.415*** 
[0.000] 
-0.027*** 
[0.000] 
-0.013* 
[0.041] 
-0.038*** 
[0.000] 
0.244*** 
[0.000] 
     
            
Governance index (GI) + 0.074*** [0.000] 
0.024*** 
[0.007] 
-0.027*** 
[0.002] 
0.034*** 
[0.000] 
0.263*** 
[0.000] 
0.103*** 
[0.000] 
    
            
Product market 
competition (CMPT) - 
-0.346*** 
[0.000] 
-0.003 
[0.659] 
-0.006 
[0.328] 
0.115*** 
[0.000] 
-0.037*** 
[0.000] 
0.057*** 
[0.000] 
-0.032*** 
[0.000] 
   
            
Analyst coverage (ACOV) - -0.364*** [0.000] 
-0.147*** 
[0.000] 
0.001 
[0.923] 
-0.017*** 
[0.001] 
-0.012 
[0.253] 
0.043*** 
[0.000] 
-0.018** 
[0.023] 
0.015*** 
[0.005] 
  
            
Analyst earnings forecast 
error (AFE) + 
0.150*** 
[0.000] 
0.002 
[0.817] 
0.001 
[0.831] 
-0.026*** 
[0.000] 
-0.019* 
[0.090] 
-0.044*** 
[0.000] 
-0.005 
[0.570] 
-0.008 
[0.165] 
-0.031*** 
[0.000] 
 
            
Analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion (AFD) + 
0.184*** 
[0.000] 
-0.005 
[0.460] 
0.011 
[0.103] 
-0.050*** 
[0.000] 
-0.013 
[0.210] 
-0.040*** 
[0.000] 
-0.001 
[0.862] 
-0.015*** 
[0.006] 
-0.020*** 
[0.000] 
0.684*** 
[0.000] 
 
B. Measures of Agency Costs 
Financial economists have attempted to measure firms’ propensity for agency 
conflicts by using measures of internal and external agency problem resolution 
mechanisms. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) address the empirical implications of the 
interdependence among such mechanisms. They examine seven mechanisms that 
potentially can control agency problems and present evidence of interdependence, 
suggesting that results obtained from cross-sectional OLS regressions of firm 
performance on several single mechanisms may be misleading. Therefore, to avoid this 
problem, I utilize ten measures used in past studies, and combine them into an agency 
costs index for each firm. These measures are described below.  
1) FCF, free cash flow. Agency conflicts involving free cash flows are likely to be 
prevalent in low growth firms because they generally have substantial free cash flow, 
which managers could decide to overinvest. In contrast, high growth firms are not as 
likely to suffer from the free cash flow problem because they are usually short of cash 
after using internal funds for funding new projects and often need to rely on external 
financing to cover their financing needs. Therefore, following Doukas, Kim, and 
Pantzalis (2000) I proxy agency costs of free cash flow using the interaction of a poor 
growth opportunities indicator with free cash flows standardized by total assets. 
,
, ,
,
  
 
 
i t
i t i t
i t
Free cash flows
FCF Gowth dummy
Total assets
⎛ ⎞= ×⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  (8) 
where Free cash flow is measured as operating income before depreciation minus the 
sum of taxes, interest expense, and dividends paid (see Lehn and Poulsen (1989)). 
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Growth dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm’s Tobin’s q is less than 1 (indicating a 
poorly managed firm) and the value of 0 otherwise, where Tobin’s q is computed as 
[market value of common equity + preferred stock liquidating value + long-term debt 
– (short-term assets – short-term liabilities)] / (total assets), as in Chung and Pruitt 
(1994). 
2) EXPR, the expense ratio which measures managers’ inefficiency in terms of 
controlling operating costs. High EXPR represents high agency costs.  
,
,
,
 i t
i t
i t
Operating expense
EXPR
Sales
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.  (9) 
3) AUR, the asset utilization ratio which measures the effectiveness of firm’s 
management in deploying assets. The idea behind the asset utilization ratio as a 
measure of agency costs is that when a firm has low sales-to-asset ratio, it is likely 
that managers act inefficient ways by making poor investment decisions, consuming 
executive perquisites, etc. Therefore, AUR should be inversely related to agency 
costs. 
,
,
, 
i t
i t
i t
Sales
AUR
Total assets
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.  (10) 
Both EXPR and AUR have been used in Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000). 
4) INDB, the proportion of independent directors on corporate board. A smaller INDB is 
an indicator of higher potential for agency conflicts. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner 
(1997) show that target shareholder gains from tender offers are higher when the 
target’s board is more independent, suggesting that independent directors are more 
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likely to use resistance strategies to enhance shareholder wealth. This notion is also 
supported by the findings of Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004). They show that the 
likelihood of corporate fraud declines as the fraction of independent directors 
increases.  
5) IO, the institutional ownership which is the percentage of shares that are owned by 
institutional investors. Given institutional investors’ monitoring role, IO should be 
inversely related to agency costs. Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) show that 
institutional investors and other blockholders vote more actively on anti-takeover 
amendments than non-blockholders, and that institutional opposition is greater when 
the proposal seems to harm stockholders. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a 
significant and positive relation between Tobin’s q and the fraction of shares owned 
by institutional investors. Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) find that 
the extent to which stock prices lead earnings is positively associated with the level of 
institutional ownership. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership 
concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
managerial compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation. They 
suggest that the institutional investors serve a monitoring role in mitigating the 
agency problems between shareholders and managers. Therefore, the higher the 
percentage ownership by institutions, the lower should be the agency costs. 
6) GI, the corporate governance index constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) to proxy for the level of shareholder rights. The Governance Index is 
constructed by counting 28 provisions related to shareholder protection and listed in 5 
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categories: Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State. Among the 28 provisions, 24 
are unique and enter the index with equal weight. Gompers et al. (2003) construct the 
governance index without requiring any judgment about the efficacy or wealth effects 
of any of these provisions but consider their impact on the balance of power between 
managers and outside shareholders. Based on Jensen’s (1986) argument that threat of 
takeover is a strong form of managerial discipline, a firm with high governance index 
(i.e., many anti-takeover provisions) is expected to have high level of agency problem.  
7) CMPT, product market competition. The competition in the product markets drives 
prices towards minimum average cost in an activity, thereby motivating managers to 
increase firm efficiency. Hart (1983), in a theoretical model shows that the 
competition in the product market reduces the amount of managerial slack. Some 
studies have empirically tested the relation between product market competition and 
corporate agency costs. For example, Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) show that 
competition in the product market reduces agency costs. My proxy for the 
competition in the product market is computed as the inverse value of Herfindahl 
concentration index.  
CMPTi = 1 – Herfindahl concentration index  
( ) 221 j
j j
Sales Sales
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢= − ⎜⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ j ⎥⎟ ,  (11) 
where Salesj is the annual sales of jth firm belonging to the industry in which firm i is 
included. If the total amount of sales in the industry is dominated by few firms, then 
the Herfindahl index will show a high value near one. Higher values of CMPT (i.e., 
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lower Herfindahl index) thus indicate that the product market is more competitive, 
and therefore CMPT should be negatively related to agency costs. 
8) ACOV, analyst coverage. Security analysis can act as a monitoring mechanism in 
reducing agency costs (Doukas et al. (2000)), and therefore ACOV is expected to be 
negatively related to agency costs. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) point out that there is 
a strong firm-size effect on analyst coverage. Therefore, the analyst coverage measure 
is based on the residuals from the regression of analyst coverage on firm size.  
9) AFE, analyst earnings forecast error. The forecast error captures forecasting ability of 
security analysts covering the firm. The absolute forecast error has been also used by 
several studies as a proxy of information asymmetry (e.g., see Atiase and Bamber 
(1994), and Christie (1987)). If a firm is transparent, the considerable amount of 
information about future earnings is available to market participants, and so analysts 
make accurate earnings forecasts. Therefore, AFE should be positively related to 
agency costs. 
, ,
,
,
( )
( )
i t i t+1
i t
i t
| Med AF EPS |
AFE =
| Med AF |
−
, (12) 
where Med(AF)i,t is the median forecast and the actual earnings per share EPSi,t+1 is 
the actual earnings per share.  
10) AFD, analyst earnings forecast dispersion. Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) 
show that analyst forecast dispersion reflects both diversity of analyst beliefs and the 
lack of precision in analyst forecasts. Prior studies have also used the dispersion of 
analyst forecasts as an information asymmetry proxy (e.g., see Krisnhnaswami and 
 75
Subramaniam (1999)). AFD is therefore supposed to be positively related to agency 
costs. 
,
,
,
. .( )
( )
i t
i t
i t
Std Dev AF
AFD =
| Med AF |
, (13) 
where Std.Dev.(AF)i,t is standard deviation of one year ahead forecasts. Analyst 
coverage, ACOV, and the two analyst forecast-based variables (AFE and AFD) are 
constructed from security analysts’ one fiscal year-ahead forecasts collected every 
June from the I/B/E/S Detail History Database. 
11) ACI, an agency cost index that combines all ten agency cost measures described 
above. Five variables (FCF, EXPR, GI, AFE, and AFD) are positively related to 
agency costs, while the other five variables (AUR, INDB, IO, CMPT, and ACOV) are 
inversely related. Thus, I construct an index (ACI) for firm’s agency costs by 
combining ranks of former five measures and inverse ranks of later five variables. 
The methodology used in the construction of ACI is the same as the one used for the 
mispricing index (MI).  
Table 10 provides detailed descriptions of all variables used to construct ACI and 
Table 11 documents descriptive statistics. Correlation coefficients are reported in Panel B 
of Table 12. By construction, free cash flows, expense ratio, governance index, forecast 
error, and forecast dispersion are positively associated with the agency cost index. In 
contrast, asset utilization ratio, proportion of independent directors, institutional 
ownership, product market competitiveness, and analyst coverage are negatively related 
to agency cost index.  
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IV. Agency Costs and Equity Mispricing 
In this section, I present analysis based on univariate tests, the design of my 
multivariate tests’ empirical methodology, and regression evidence on the relation 
between agency costs and equity mispricing. 
 
A. Univariate Analyses 
Table 13 illustrates how high agency cost firms differ from low agency cost firms 
in terms of firm characteristics. It reports mean values of all variables used in the study 
for the quintile groups classified based on the level of the agency cost index (ACI). Also 
reported are the mean differences across the two extreme groups (highest versus lowest 
ACI quintiles) and the corresponding t-statistics for the mean difference tests. In line with 
hypothesis #1, the mispricing index (MI) shows a positive relation with the level of 
agency costs. The mean difference of MI between the highest and lowest ACI quintile 
groups is 0.038 with t-statistic of 13.92. The dollar amount of the different CEO 
compensation components, in most cases, is on average lower for firms in the highest 
ACI quintile compared to firms in the lowest ACI quintile. The evidence from the 
remaining firm-specific variables is consistent with prior studies examining the 
relationship of agency costs and firm characteristics. Firms with high levels of agency 
costs are generally younger, smaller, more levered and less profitable than firms with low 
levels of agency costs. They are also more likely to be diversified across many industries, 
and less likely to pay dividends.  
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Table 13 
Univariate Tests 
 
Reported are mean values of variables for the quartile subsamples sorted on agency cost index (ACI). Also reported are the differences in mean values between high- and 
low-ACI firms and the corresponding t-statistics. All variables are as defined in Table 10. * and *** indicate significance at the 10%- and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
  Sorted on agency cost index (ACI) 
 
   
   Low
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
High 
Q5 
Mean diff.: 
High - Low 
t-stat: 
Diff.=0 
Mispricing measure         
 Mispricing index (MI)        
      
 0.504
 
0.479 0.482 0.502 0.541 0.038***
 
13.92
Compensation variables 
 Total compensation (TCOMP)
 
        
       
        
       
       
        
        
       
         
      
      
 4899 3926 3202 3388 2367 -2531*** -4.30
Salary (SALARY)  613.4 611.9 577.3 573.8 553.1 -60.34*** -5.28
Bonus (BONUS)  660.9 651.8 534.2 526.2 403.5 -257.4***
 
 -7.97
 Restricted stock grant (RSTOCK)
 
 829.5 266.8 327.3 255.5 244.0 -585.4 -1.18
 Stock options (OPTION)  2518 2061 1393 1712 874.1 -1644*** -5.78
 Long-term incentive plan (LTIP)  109.7 190.8 152.3 121.9 101.8 -7.949 -0.32
 Other annual compensation (OTHERC)
 
 45.19 40.88 40.57 43.25 48.27 3.079 0.38
 All other compensation (ALLOC)  122.3 102.7 177.3 155.0 142.4 20.12 0.93
 % of restricted stock grant (%RSTOCK )
 
 0.054 0.047 0.057 0.048 0.055 0.001 0.28
 % of stock options (%OPTION )  0.238
 
0.203 0.162 0.146 0.094 -0.144***
 
 -14.08
Firm characteristics 
 Firm size (SIZE)       
         
       
      
        
        
 20.04 19.98 19.78 19.58 19.42 -0.614*** -23.57
Leverage (LEV)  0.104 0.139 0.165 0.188 0.217 0.114*** 38.96
 Return on assets (ROA)
 
 0.084 0.059 0.037 0.006 -0.031 -0.114*** -61.95
 Firm age (AGE)  2.399 2.440 2.383 2.301 2.150 -0.250*** -18.96
 Diversification dummy (DIVER)  0.299 0.339 0.346 0.340 0.314 0.015* 1.80
Dividend-payer dummy (DD)  0.471 0.472 0.418 0.332 0.202 -0.269*** -36.15
 
 
 
B. Multivariate Analyses 
Univariate tests can only provide limited insight into whether the positive impact 
of agency costs on equity mispricing is driven by other firm variables. This potential limit 
of univariate testing can be overcome in a multivariate test setting. I perform the 
multivariate analysis of the relation between agency costs and mispricing by using time-
series average of cross-sectional regressions (as in Fama and MacBeth (1973)).32 I 
estimate the following regression equation: 
 MIi,t = β0 + β1 ACIi,t + β2 SIZEi,t + β3 LEVi,t + β4 ROAi,t + β5 AGEi,t  
+ β6 DIVERi,t + β7 DDi,t + µi,t, (14) 
where i indexes firms, t is a yearly time index, and ACI is the agency cost index. Based 
on the literature on equity mispricing, I use a number of different control variables. They 
are market capitalization (SIZE), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), firm age (AGE), a 
diversification dummy (DIVER), and a dividend-payer dummy (DD). Descriptions of all 
variables are in Table 10 with descriptive statistics provided in Table 11. 
                                                 
32 Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), I estimate separate annual regressions and calculate t-statistics as 
follows. 
ˆ
ˆ( ) ˆ( ) 1
j
j
j
t
s n
ββ β= − , where 
ˆ
jβ  is the mean coefficient over the sample years, ˆ( )js β  is the 
standard deviation of the yearly estimates, and n is the number of years. 
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Table 14 
Agency Cost and Equity Mispricing 
 
This table shows time-series average of cross-sectional regressions of mispricing on idiosyncratic volatility and other 
firm characteristics. All variables are as defined in Table 10. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%- and 1%-levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Dep. var. = MI  Dep. var. = Log of MI 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Intercept 0.448*** 
(70.37) 
0.771*** 
(24.94) 
 0.360*** 
(72.46) 
0.584*** 
(27.35) 
      
Agency cost index (ACI) 0.106*** 
(8.39) 
0.031*** 
(2.87) 
   
 
Log of ACI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.100*** 
 
0.024** 
(8.04) (2.25) 
      
Log of total assets (SIZE)  -0.008*** 
(-4.48) 
  -0.005*** 
(-4.62) 
      
Leverage (LEV)  -0.198*** 
(-10.81) 
  -0.126*** 
(-10.18) 
      
Return on assets (ROA)  -0.069** 
(-2.47) 
  -0.047** 
(-2.61) 
      
Log of firm age (AGE)  -0.029*** 
(-21.04) 
  -0.019*** 
(-20.00) 
      
Diversification dummy (DIVER)  -0.030*** 
(-10.06) 
  -0.020*** 
(-9.64) 
      
Dividend-payer dummy (DD)  -0.065*** 
(-16.59) 
  -0.044*** 
(16.40) 
N 38,781 30,716  38,781 30,176 
Average R2 0.91% 21.61%  0.83% 21.57% 
 
The regression results appear in Table 14.33 Columns [1] and [2] display the 
models where the mispricing index (MI) is the dependent variable, while columns [3] and 
[4] show results for models where the log-transformed mispricing index is used as 
dependent variable.34 The results show a significant positive relation between agency 
costs and mispricing, suggesting that higher agency costs are strongly associated with 
higher levels of equity mispricing. In regressions [1] and [2], the estimated coefficient of 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that the results I obtained using the individual mispricing measures compiled in MI are 
qualitatively similar to the ones reported here. They are left out of the paper for the sake of brevity, but are 
available upon request. 
34 This transformation is to guard against a possibility that mispricing index (MI) which takes value from 0 
to 1 can lead to erroneous interpretation of results. I find that the results are, as shown, very similar to ones 
obtained from the original regressions. 
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the agency cost index is 0.106 with a t-statistic of 8.39 and 0.100 with a t-statistic of 8.04, 
respectively. Controlling for other firm characteristics does not qualitatively change the 
result, even though the coefficients of the agency cost variable and the corresponding t-
statistics are reduced. The coefficients of the control variables suggest that equity 
mispricing is especially high for firms that are small, less leveraged, less profitable, 
young, and less likely to pay dividends. Contrary to previous studies, e.g. Berger and 
Ofek (1995), industrial diversification is found to be negatively related to equity 
mispricing. Overall, the results from Table 14 indicate that the level of agency costs is a 
strong determinant of equity mispricing in support of hypothesis #1. 
 
C. Robustness Tests 
In this sub-section I present several robustness checks aimed at ensuring that the 
findings in Table V are not due to the particular estimation methodology used. First, since 
my study relies on cross-sectional/time-series data, I use a fixed-effects model which 
regards differences between firms as parametric shifts of the regression function and 
controls for possible differences across firms. Second, I compute difference-in-
differences estimates by including year fixed-effects as well as firm fixed-effects. Third, I 
compute statistical significances using White’s (1980) standard errors which are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Finally, I estimate a model using only the first-year observation of 
each firm. This robustness check with the first-year data allows me to assess whether or 
not previous results are driven by the existence of multiple observations on the same 
firms. The results of these robustness checks are reported in Table 15. To save space, 
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Table 15 only reports the results of regression models that include all firm-specific 
control variables. I find that all regressions show a consistent pattern of coefficients on 
the agency costs index (ACI). They all remain positive and statistically significant. 
Therefore, the previous results shown in Table 14 are confirmed by these alternative 
regression models.  
 
V. Interpretation of the Positive Relation between Agency Costs and Equity 
Mispricing 
So far, I have found that the level of agency costs is significantly and positively 
related with equity mispricing. As discussed earlier, agency theory defines agency costs 
as the costs incurred by an organization that are associated with problems such as interest 
conflicts between management and shareholders and/or information asymmetry where 
managers discriminately have better and/or more information than shareholders. In my 
previous results, I cannot convey whether mispricing is caused by informational 
asymmetry or incentive conflicts. To directly test this, I control for equity-based 
compensation which can potentially resolve agency problems, but not necessarily reduce 
information asymmetry.  
Table 15 
Robustness Checks of Regression of Equity Mispricing on Agency Cost 
 
This table reports robustness checks of regressions of mispricing on agency cost and other firm characteristics. Reported are the coefficients and t-statistics of regression 
models [2] and [4] in Table V. Columns [1] and [2] report results using panel regressions. Columns [3] and [4] report results of regressions computing difference-in-
difference estimates (i.e., including firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects). Columns [5] and [6] report results using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity correction 
model. Columns [7] and [8] report results only using the first-year data of each firm. All variables are as defined in Table 10. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel regression model Difference-in-differences 
White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity 
correction model First-year regression 
 
[1] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[2] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
[3] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[4] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
[5] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[6] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
[7] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[8] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
Intercept  0.961***
(54.42) 
0.700*** 
(59.44) 
0.957*** 
(50.17) 
0.694*** 
(54.70) 
0.789*** 
(31.44) 
0.596*** 
(34.72) 
0.749*** 
(20.77) 
0.567*** 
(24.15) 
         
Agency cost index (ACI)      
  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0.035***
(4.19) 
0.035*** 
(4.17) 
0.031** 
(2.52) 
0.051***
(2.95) 
 
    
 0.030***
 
0.031***
 
0.024*
 
0.043**Log of ACI
(3.65) (3.71) (1.94) (2.55) 
  
-0.018***
 
 -0.012*** 
 
-0.017*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.008*** 
 
-0.006*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.005*** Log of total assets (SIZE)
(-19.01) (-18.90) 
   
(-16.86) (-16.43) 
 
(-6.23) 
 
(-6.50) 
 
(-3.60) 
 
(-3.98) 
  
Leverage (LEV) -0.139*** -0.090*** 
(-21.79) (-21.28) 
   
-0.145*** 
(-22.12) 
-0.094*** 
(-21.75) 
 
-0.227*** 
(-25.54) 
 
-0.146*** 
(-24.42) 
 
-0.270*** 
(-19.47) 
 
-0.169*** 
(-18.98) 
  
Return on assets (ROA) -0.104*** -0.070*** 
(-13.29) (-13.36) 
   
-0.108*** 
(-13.44) 
-0.072*** 
(-13.58) 
 
-0.140*** 
(-11.72) 
 
-0.091*** 
(-12.03) 
 
-0.153*** 
(-9.25) 
 
-0.097*** 
(-9.14) 
  
Log of firm age (AGE) -0.033*** -0.022*** 
(-20.21) (-19.96) 
   
-0.033*** 
(-18.97) 
-0.021*** 
(-18.63) 
 
-0.029*** 
(-13.58) 
 
-0.019*** 
(-13.20) 
 
-0.017*** 
(-5.50) 
 
-0.011*** 
(-5.42) 
  
Diversification dummy (DIVER) -0.010*** -0.007*** 
(-4.40) (-4.72) 
   
-0.014*** 
(-5.89) 
-0.010*** 
(-6.01) 
 
-0.026*** 
(-7.46) 
 
-0.018*** 
(-7.46) 
 
-0.035*** 
(-6.11) 
 
-0.023*** 
(-6.23) 
  
Dividend-payer dummy (DD) -0.041*** -0.029*** 
(-14.29) (-15.05) 
-0.042*** 
(-13.97) 
-0.030*** 
(-15.01) 
-0.061*** 
(-14.73) 
-0.042*** 
(-14.90) 
-0.063*** 
(-10.05) 
-0.042*** 
(-10.37) 
No. of observations 30,716 30,716 30,716 30,716 30,716 30,716 4,883 4,883
Average R2 19.56%        19.57% 20.05% 20.10% 20.86% 20.74% 19.39% 19.37%
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Figure 6 
Comparisons of Equity Mispricing Levels 
 
This figure presents averages of mispricing measures for users and non-users of restricted stock grant (in Panel A) or stock options (in Panel B). *** indicates 
significance at the 1%-level. 
 
Panel A: Comparisons of mispricing levels between users and non-users of restricted stock grants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Comparisons of mispricing levels between users and non-users of stock options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
|EXVRI| |EXVBO| |EXVRK| |EXVMB| |ARET| 
|EXVRI| |EXVBO| |EXVRK| |EXVMB| |ARET| 
0.80
0.83
0.86
0.89
Non-users Users
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
Non-users Users
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Non-users Users
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Non-users Users
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
Non-users Users
0.80
0.83
0.86
0.89
Non-users Users
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
Non-users Users
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Non-users Users
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Non-users Users
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
Non-users Users
Difference: 0.004*** Difference: -0.060*** Difference: -0.068*** Difference: -0.048*** Difference: -0.018 
Difference: 0.017*** Difference: 0.099*** Difference: 0.090*** Difference: 0.085*** Difference: 0.040*** 
 
My tests focus on equity-based compensation, i.e., restricted stock and stock 
option grants. I create two dummy variables which take the value of one if a firm uses 
restricted stock grant (alternatively, stock options) for CEO compensation, and take the 
value of zero otherwise. The relationship between equity based compensation 
components and the different mispricing measures is graphically reported in Figure 6. 
Panel A shows how the five individual mispricing measures differ for firms that use 
versus firms that do not use restricted stock grants, while Panel B shows the 
corresponding comparison between firms that use versus firms that do not use stock 
options. Figure 6 clearly shows that firms providing restricted stock grants to their CEOs 
are substantially less mispriced than firms which do not. All differences are economically 
and statistically significant. As shown in Panel B, however, the use of stock option grants 
for CEOs is positively associated with mispricing. This evidence provides support for the 
notion that CEOs may want to induce stock mispricing when their compensation relies 
heavily on stock options. 
The univariate tests results that correspond to Figure 6 are in line with the second 
hypothesis, which suggests that the impact of agency costs on mispricing gets stronger 
(weaker) when the proportion of the CEO’s compensation that comes from options 
(restricted stocks) increase. This implies that the coefficient of the agency cost index 
(ACI), β1 in equation (14), can be expressed as: 
β1 = δ0 + δ1 (%RSTOCKi,t) + δ2 (%OPTIONi,t) (15) 
δ1 and δ2 capture the effect of restricted stock grants (%RSTOCKi,t) and option grants 
(%OPTIONi,t) as percentages of total compensation respectively, on agency costs. These 
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two coefficients represent the effect on mispricing from the firm’s choice of equity-based 
compensation, which determine the degree of interest conflicts in an agency problem. 
Here δ0 represents the leftover effect of agency costs (i.e., that related to information 
asymmetry) on mispricing. Subsequently, I plug equation (15) into the expression of 
equation (14) and re-write the model as: 
           MIi,t = β0 + β1 ACIi,t + β2 (ACIi,t * %RSTOCKi,t) + β3 (ACIi,t * %OPTIONi,t)  
                        + β4 SIZEi,t + β5 LEVi,t + β6 ROAi,t + β7 AGEi,t + β8 DIVERi,t  
+ β9 DDi,t + µi,t. (16) 
If my tests provide support for the second hypothesis, the first coefficient (β1, 
capturing the effect of information asymmetry on mispricing) should no longer be 
significant. If the third hypothesis is supported, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between agency cost and restricted stock grant (β2) will be negative and the coefficient of 
the interaction term between agency cost and stock options (β3) will be positive. 
Table 16 documents the coefficients of the above regression model. I estimate the 
time-series average of cross-sectional regressions, as in Table 14 and the three other 
robustness regressions as in Table 15. My results show that, in contrast to the findings of 
studies claiming that information asymmetry is a key determinant in equity mispricing, 
the leftover agency cost (i.e., information asymmetry) is not a powerful explanatory 
variable in most cases after controlling for the interaction terms of ACI with 
compensation variables that are directly related to the degree of the conflict of interests 
between CEO and owners. As predicted in hypothesis #3, the interaction between 
restricted stock grants and agency costs generally shows a negative impact on mispricing. 
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However, this effect is not statistically significant. Moreover, I find that the coefficient of 
the interaction term between option grants and agency costs is significant and positive in 
all models. This result is consistent with the notion that mispricing increases as the use of 
stock options exaggerates the agency problem between managers and shareholders. 
In sum, my findings provide two important insights. First, in addition to the level 
of information asymmetry, the conflict of interests between management and investors is 
an important explanatory variable of equity mispricing. Second, the use of stock options 
does not resolve the interest conflicts, but it exaggerates the problem. The findings 
suggest that the use of restricted stock grants, which are less likely related to managerial 
myopia, is a better choice to reduce interest conflicts in that it does not exacerbate 
mispricing.   
 
Table 16 
Different Effects of Agency Cost on Equity Mispricing 
 
Reported are the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics of regression models which control interacted terms of equity compensation variables. Columns [1] and [2] 
report results using time-series average of cross-sectional regressions. Columns [3] and [4] report results using panel regressions. Columns [5] and [6] report results of 
regressions computing difference-in-difference estimates (i.e., including firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects). Columns [7] and [8] report results using White’s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity correction model. Columns [9] and [10] report results only using the first-year data of each firm. All variables are as defined in Table 10. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
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 Time-series average of 
cross-sectional 
regression Panel regression model 
Difference-in-
differences 
White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity 
correction model First-year regression 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 
  [1]
Dep. var = 
MI 
[2] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
[3] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[4] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
[5] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[6] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
[7] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[8] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
[9] 
Dep. var = 
MI 
[10] 
Dep. var = 
Log of MI 
Intercept 0.824*** 0.613*** 
(12.37) (13.48) 
1.058*** 
(26.34) 
0.752*** 
(28.01) 
1.040*** 
(24.25) 
0.738*** 
(25.80) 
0.758*** 
(14.04) 
0.566*** 
(15.67) 
0.982*** 
(13.07) 
0.708*** 
(14.57) 
           
Agency cost index (ACI)         
    
      
    
          
   
          
    
         
    
          
 
 
 
 
  
 
        
0.005
(0.30) 
 
0.011
(0.65) 
0.012
(0.67) 
0.031
(1.20) 
0.064*  
(1.76) 
    
-0.003
  
ACI * (%RSTOCK ) 0.032 
(1.05) 
 
(-0.14) 
   
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.001
(0.03) 
-0.008
(-0.12) 
 
  
0.112***
  
ACI * (%OPTION)
(5.89) 
 
0.067***
(6.55) 
   
0.069***
(6.63) 
0.128***
(8.09) 
0.156***
(5.63) 
 
    
0.044*Log of ACI  0.002
(0.11) 
0.012
(0.70) 
0.013
(0.74) 
   
0.029
(1.12) (1.90) 
    
-0.008Log of ACI * (%RSTOCK) 0.027
(1.04) 
-0.005 
(-0.28) 
-0.04
(-0.21) 
   
0.0005 
(0.02) (-0.14) 
    
Log of ACI * (%OPTION) 0.089*** 
(5.85) 
0.054***
(6.30) 
0.055***
(6.41) 
0.101***
(7.99) 
0.121***
(5.40) 
  
-0.008**
   
-0.020*** 
   
-0.012*** 
   
-0.011*** Log of total assets (SIZE)  -0.005** 
(-2.50) 
 
(-2.47) (-9.53) 
   
-0.012*** 
(-9.06) 
-0.019*** 
(-8.71) (-8.18) 
   
-0.005* 
(-1.83) 
-0.003** 
(-1.83) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.56) (-4.55) 
    
Leverage (LEV) -0.252*** -0.160*** 
(-9.75) 
 
(-9.39) 
-0.137*** 
(-9.66) 
   
-0.090*** 
(-9.50) 
-0.139*** 
(-9.74) 
-0.091*** 
(-9.58) 
   
-0.273*** 
(-14.29) 
-0.177*** 
(-13.81) 
-0.252*** 
(-8.04) 
-0.159*** 
(-7.85) 
    
Return on assets (ROA) -0.058* -0.042* 
(-1.85) 
 
(-2.11) 
-0.112*** 
(-6.54) 
   
-0.078*** 
(-6.79) 
-0.113*** 
(-6.44) 
-0.078*** 
(-6.65) 
   
-0.106*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.074*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.070 
(-1.46) 
-0.046 
(-1.49) 
    
Log of firm age (AGE) -0.029*** -0.018*** 
(-9.22) 
 
(-9.34) 
-0.039*** 
(-10.54) 
   
-0.025*** 
(-10.26) 
-0.038*** 
(-9.99) 
-0.024*** 
(-9.69) 
   
-0.031*** 
(-6.89) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.031*** 
(-6.14) 
-0.020*** 
(-5.99) 
    
Diversification dummy (DIVER) -0.029***
(-5.86) 
 
-0.020*** 
(-6.18) 
-0.012*** 
(-3.12) 
   
-0.009*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.94) 
   
-0.035*** 
(-5.79) 
-0.024*** 
(-5.87) 
-0.018* 
(-1.95) 
-0.013** 
(-2.13) 
    
Dividend-payer dummy (DD) -0.078*** -0.052*** 
(-17.38) (-18.59) 
-0.054*** 
(-9.85) 
-0.036*** 
(-10.11) 
-0.056*** 
(-9.80) 
-0.038*** 
(-10.15) 
-0.075*** 
(-10.29) 
-0.050*** 
(-10.37) 
-0.082*** 
(-8.44) 
-0.054*** 
(-8.57) 
No. of observations 8,657 8,657 8,657 8,657 8,657 8,657 8,657 8,657 1,481 1,481
R2 24.68%          24.22% 21.21% 21.01% 21.41% 21.22% 24.14% 23.68% 27.22% 26.91%
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
Recently, the finance literature has emphasized the importance of equity 
mispricing. The contribution of this paper is that it reconciles different views of 
mispricing and its causes, and specifically develops evidence on a link between agency 
theory and stock mispricing. Finance theory defines agency costs of equity as the 
organizational costs associated with problems arising from conflicts of interest between 
managements and shareholders in the presence of information asymmetry, i.e. in cases 
where managers discriminately have better and/or more information than shareholders. 
Previous studies have found that there is a strong positive relation between information 
asymmetry and equity mispricing, but have generally neglected the effect of conflicts of 
interest on mispricing. 
In this paper, I utilize ten agency costs proxies and provide evidence that the level 
of agency costs is significantly and positively related with equity mispricing. Unlike the 
existing literature, I find that the conflict of interests is a more important variable than 
information asymmetry in explaining the equity mispricing. Previous studies suggesting 
that stock-based compensation is an efficient mechanism for resolving agency problems 
typically treat all stock-based incentives equally and relate them to both lowered agency 
costs and enhanced firm stock value. Given both academic evidence and the recent 
skepticism about the effectiveness of equity-based compensation fueled from financial 
scandals (i.e., Enron and WorldCom), I separately analyze two different components of 
equity-based compensation, i.e., stock options and restricted stock grants. I find that the 
use of stock options, originally intended to resolve interest conflicts, actually exaggerates 
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the problem and results in more stock mispricing. The evidence suggests that the use of 
restricted stock grants which are not related to managerial myopia is a better choice to 
reduce interest conflicts.   
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